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Abstract
The rise of algorithmic decision making in a variety of applications has also raised
concerns about its potential for discrimination against certain social groups. However,
incorporating nondiscrimination goals into the design of algorithmic decision making
systems (or, classifiers) has proven to be quite challenging. These challenges arise mainly
due to the computational complexities involved in the process, and the inadequacy of
existing measures to computationally capture discrimination in various situations. The
goal of this thesis is to tackle these problems.
First, with the aim of incorporating existing measures of discrimination (namely,
disparate treatment and disparate impact) into the design of well-known classifiers, we
introduce a mechanism of decision boundary covariance, that can be included in the
formulation of any convex boundary-based classifier in the form of convex constraints.
Second, we propose alternative measures of discrimination. Our first proposed measure,
disparate mistreatment, is useful in situations when unbiased ground truth training data
is available. The other two measures, preferred treatment and preferred impact, are
useful in situations when feature and class distributions of different social groups are
significantly different, and can additionally help reduce the cost of nondiscrimination
(as compared to the existing measures). We also design mechanisms to incorporate these
new measures into the design of convex boundary-based classifiers.
iv
Kurzdarstellung
Die Vielzahl der Anwendungen, die Algorithmen immer stärker an Entscheidungsprozessen
beteiligen, wächst stetig. Dadurch werden Bedenken über die potenzielle Diskrim-
inierung bestimmter gesellschaftlicher Gruppen aufgeworfen. Die Aufnahme von Nicht-
diskriminierungszielsetzungen bei der Gestaltung algorithmischer Entscheidungs- bzw.
Klassifizierungssysteme hat sich jedoch als grosse Herausforderung herausgestellt. Zum
einen sind die nötigen Berechnungen komplex und zum anderen sind die existierenden
Metriken unzureichend, um Diskriminierung in bestimmten Situationen rechnerisch zu
erfassen. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, diese Problematik anzugehen.
Als erstes stellen wir einen Decision Boundary-basierten Kovarianzmechanismus vor,
der genutzt werden kann, um existierende Diskriminierungsmetriken (also Disparate
Treatment und Disparate Impact) beim Entwurf von gängigen Klassifizierungsalgo-
rithmen einzusetzen. Der Ansatz kann für jeden konvexen Boundary-basierten Klassi-
fizierungsalgorithmus in Form konvexer Constraints formuliert werden. Als nächstes
definieren wir neue Diskriminierungsmetriken. Unsere erste Metrik namens Disparate
Mistreatment kommt in Situationen zum Einsatz, in denen die Referenzdaten nicht
zugunsten einer sozialen Gruppe verzerrt sind. Die übrigen beiden Metriken namens
Preferred Treatment und Preferred Impact sind für Situationen konzipiert, in denen die
Feature- und Klassenverteilungen unterschiedlicher sozialer Gruppen stark voneinander
abweichen. Sie können dabei helfen, die Kosten von Nichtdiskriminierung im Vergleich
zu bestehenden Metriken zu reduzieren. Wir zeigen ebenfalls, wie diese neuen Metriken
in konvexen Boundary-basierten Klassifizierungsalgorithmen genutzt werden können.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Algorithmic decision making in social domains
Data-driven algorithmic decision making has been used in applications involving hu-
man subjects for several decades. For instance, credit scoring algorithms were being
deployed in practice in as early as the 1950s (FICO, 2018a; Furletti, 2002), and parole
risk assessment algorithms have been in use since the 1970s (Hoffman and Beck, 1974;
Kehl and Kessler, 2017). However, with the advent of complex learning methods, and
convenient accessibility of “big data”, algorithmic decision making is permeating into
an ever-increasing number of human-centric applications, where algorithms are used
to assist, or sometimes even replace human decision makers. Some examples include
job screening (Posse, 2016), healthcare (Bhardwaj et al., 2017), community safety (Perry,
2013), product personalization (Covington et al., 2016), online ad delivery (Graepel et al.,
2010) and social benefits assignments (Niklas et al., 2015).
Algorithmic decision making has shown great promise in increasing the accuracy
and scalability of the applications under consideration. For example, a recent study
by Liu et al. (2017) shows that machine learning models can achieve a performance com-
parable to that of humans when detecting cancer metastases. Goel et al. (2016) show that
in applications such as stop-question-and-frisk (Meares, 2014)—where pedestrians are
stopped by police officers on the suspicion of possessing illegal weapons—algorithmic
decision making can recover the majority of illegal weapons, while making much fewer
stops (6%) as compared to human decision makers (that is, the police officers). Similarly,
Kleinberg et al. (2018) found that when making bail decisions, algorithms can signif-
icantly reduce the crime rate (by 25%) while maintaining the same incarceration rate.
Several other studies have also shown evidence that algorithms can help increase the
performance of the task at hand in domains ranging from hiring (Kuncel et al., 2013,
2014) to education (Dickson, 2017).
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
Algorithmic decision making also presents potential for several additional advan-
tages, such as, reducing the arbitrariness and implicit human biases in decision making.
For example, while different human judges are known to grant different decisions to
similar defendants (Dobbie et al., 2018; Kleinberg et al., 2018), algorithms can be easily
designed to overcome this issue. Similarly, whereas human judgments can be poten-
tially swayed (unintentionally) by various factors ranging from unconscious human
biases (Badger, 2016; Tatum, 2017) to the hunger level of human judges (Danziger et al.,
2011), the design of algorithmic decision making systems suggests that they can trivially
avoid these problems.
1.2 Discrimination in algorithmic decision making systems
Despite its apparent advantages, algorithmic decision making has also caused concerns
about potential discrimination against people with certain social traits (e.g., gender, race),
also referred to as sensitive features.
For example, Sweeney (2013) found that Google’s AdSense platform was dispropor-
tionately associating predominantly African-American names as having arrest records, as
compared to the predominantly White names. A recent analysis by ProPublica claimed
that COMPAS, a recidivism risk assessment tool used in courts across several locations in
the United States (US), was biased against African-American defendants (Angwin et al.,
2016). An analysis by Bolukbasi et al. (2016) revealed that the word2vec word embed-
dings (Mikolov et al., 2013) used in a number of downstream tasks such as translation,
web search and sentiment analysis, were biased along gender stereotypes present in
the society. Similarly, a number of other instance have been reported where algorithms
(unintentionally) discriminated against certain social groups (Buolamwini and Gebru,
2018; Fussell, 2017; Pachal, 2015).
In this context, there have been calls from governments (Muñoz et al., 2016; Podesta
et al., 2014), regulatory authorities (FTC, 2016; Goodman and Flaxman, 2016), civil rights
unions (Eidelman, 2017) and researchers (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; ON´eil, 2016; Pasquale,
2015) to tackle the potential discriminatory effects of algorithmic decision making. For
example, a recent report by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2016) points out
that data-driven algorithmic decision making can “create or reinforce existing disparities”
or “create new justification for exclusion”, and urged that “companies should assess the
factors that go into an analytics model and balance the predictive value of the model with
fairness considerations”. Similarly, Recital 71 of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) that came into effect in May 2018, requires organizations handling
personal data of European Union (EU) users to “prevent, inter alia, discriminatory effects
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on natural persons on the basis of” certain social traits such as sexual orientation and
ethnic origin (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016; Goodman, 2016).
1.3 Challenges in tackling discrimination
While avoiding discrimination based on certain socially salient traits (e.g., gender, race)
is a legal principle in many countries (Altman, 2016; Civil Rights Act, 1964), eliminating
discrimination from algorithmic decision outcomes poses a tough challenge. Two of the
major reasons for this difficulty are:
I. Algorithmic decision making systems are typically designed to optimize for pre-
diction accuracy while enabling efficient training. Efficient training here refers to
finding the optimal algorithm parameters rapidly, and is a crucial property while
learning from large training datasets (Bishop, 2006). Incorporating nondiscrimina-
tion mechanisms into these systems—i.e., optimizing for prediction accuracy under
nondiscrimination constraints—while simultaneously preserving efficient training,
is often quite difficult.
II. While the nondiscrimination principle “enjoys impressive global consensus” (Alt-
man, 2016), operationalizing this principle to measure discrimination (to eventually
eliminate it) is a non-trivial task. Here, operationalization refers to the process of
formalizing or interpreting a fuzzy concept so as to make it measurable for empirical
observations (Lukyanenko et al., 2014). For example, what constitutes a discrimina-
tory practice in one case might not do so in another. In fact, one widely accepted
measure of discrimination (namely, disparate impact), is known to lead to “reverse
discrimination” if applied out of context (Ricci, 2009).
1.4 Thesis contributions
This thesis tries to address the above challenges. Below, we discuss our research contri-
butions towards this end.
I. Proposing mechanisms for existing nondiscrimination measures
Existing studies in discrimination-aware machine learning mostly quantify discrimina-
tion using two measures inspired by anti-discrimination legislation in various countries:
disparate treatment and disparate impact (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). As we will dis-
cuss in detail in Section 2, while it is desirable to train decision making systems that
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
are nondiscriminatory with respect to both the measures, doing so in practice is quite
difficult due to computational complexities involved.
To overcome the computational issues in training nondiscriminatory classifiers,
we propose a novel and intuitive mechanism of decision boundary covariance. This
mechanism satisfies several desirable properties: (i) it can limit discrimination with
respect to both disparate treatment and disparate impact; (ii) for a wide variety of convex
boundary-based linear and non-linear classifiers (e.g., logistic regression, SVM), it is
convex and can be readily incorporated in their formulation without increasing their
complexity, hence ensuring efficient learning; (iii) it allows for clear mechanisms to trade-
off nondiscrimination and accuracy; and, (iv) it can be used to ensure nondiscrimination
with respect to several sensitive features.
Experiments using both synthetic and real-world data show that our mechanism
allows for a fine-grained control of the level of nondiscrimination, often at a small cost in
terms of accuracy, and provides more flexibility than the state-of-the-art.
II. Proposing new measures of nondiscrimination (and designing mechanisms)
We also propose new measures of nondiscrimination that can avoid some shortcomings
of the existing measures.
First, we argue that while the disparate impact measure of nondiscrimination might
be quite intuitive in certain situations—e.g., situations where the historical decisions in the
training data are potentially biased (i.e., groups of people with certain sensitive attributes
may have historically received discriminatory treatment), its utility is somewhat limited
in cases when the ground truth training labels are available. We then propose an
alternative measure of nondiscrimination, disparate mistreatment, which is useful in
situations when the validity of historical decisions in the training data can be ascertained.
Next, we note that while existing measures of nondiscrimination in machine learning
are based on parity (of treatment or impact), under some interpretations, a lack of parity
might not necessarily constitute as discrimination. Specifically, drawing inspiration from
the concepts of fair-divisions and envy-freeness in economics and game theory, we pro-
pose two additional measures of nondiscrimination: preferred treatment and preferred
impact. These measures are useful in situations when feature and class distributions
of different groups subject to the decision making are significantly different. These
measures are based on the idea that certain distributions of outcomes might be preferred
by different groups even when the outcomes do not necessarily follow parity as specified
by disparate treatment and disparate impact. We also show that these new measures can
help reduce the cost of nondiscrimination.
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We also extend our decision boundary covariance mechanism and incorporate the
newly proposed nondiscrimination measures into the formulations of convex boundary-
based classifiers, this time as convex-concave constraints. The resulting formulations can
be solved efficiently using recent advances in convex-concave programming.
1.5 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we provide background on discrimination in machine learning.
Specifically, we discuss the concept of discrimination in the context of social sciences
and law. We then describe how discrimination is measured in classification tasks.
• In Chapter 3, we design mechanisms to eliminate discrimination from classification
outcomes, when it is measured using existing notions of disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
• In Chapter 4, we propose a new measure of discrimination which we refer to as
disparate mistreatment. We describe how disparate mistreatment can overcome
some shortcomings of the existing measure of disparate impact. We also propose
mechanisms to train classifiers without disparate mistreatment.
• In Chapter 5, we depart from the legal perspective of discrimination and introduce
two new measures of discrimination: preferred treatment and preferred impact,
which are inspired by ideas from economics and game theory. We then design
mechanisms to train classifiers satisfying these two new (non)discrimination crite-
ria.
• In Chapter 6, we review literature from various areas related to discrimination-
aware algorithmic decision making.
• In Chapter 7, we add a discussion on the limitations of our work, and explore
avenues of future work.
CHAPTER 2
Background
In this chapter, we provide background on important concepts used throughout this
thesis. We start off by discussing the concept of discrimination. Next, considering that
most existing notions of discrimination in machine learning literature are inspired by
anti-discrimination laws, we describe different measures used to detect discrimination in
legal domains in various countries. We then close the chapter by explaining how these
measures are formalized in the area of machine learning.
2.1 What is discrimination?
After reviewing literature from various domains including law and philosophy, Altman
(2016) defines discrimination as practices that:1
“wrongfully impose a relative disadvantage on persons based on their membership
in a salient social group”
While the definition is quite intuitive at the first glance, there are several important points
to be considered:
Discrimination is a relative phenomenon. Altman notes that discrimination occurs
when a person or a group is given disadvantageous treatment relative to some other
group. He notes that this point is affirmed by the US Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown, 1954) which ruled that racial segregation in public schools was
discriminatory because it put African-Americans children at a relative disadvantage as
compared to White children.
Moreover, Altman contrasts differential treatment with relative disadvantage, and men-
tions that not all groups that receive different treatment from each other are being
1Other sources like Lippert-Rasmussen (2006) and Cook (2015) provide similar definitions.
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discriminated against. He argues that under the segregation practices in the Ameri-
can South, while the treatment of African-Americans and Whites was different from
each other, and while this differential treatment might have held back the progress for
everyone in the South, only African-Americans (and not Whites) were the victims of
discrimination.
Not all groups are socially salient. While society can be divided into groups along
different dimensions (e.g., based on eye color, music preferences), not all ways of group-
ing people form salient social groups. According to Lippert-Rasmussen (2006), socially
salient groups are the ones that are “important to the structure of social interactions
across a wide range of social contexts”.
On a more legal side, salient social groups (also called protected groups),2 among
other factors, are formed based on groupings that were the basis of consistent social
injustices and oppression in the past (Altman, 2016; Barocas and Hardt, 2017). As a result,
laws in different countries define socially salient groups accordingly. For example, with
respect to employment, the protected features under the US anti-discrimination law are:
race, color, gender, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, pregnancy, familial status,
disability status, veteran status and genetic information (Barocas and Hardt, 2017). EU
law has a very similar list of protected grounds. Interestingly, EU law also designates
language as a protected ground (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010).
Finally, based on the contemporary discourse in a society, the definition of salient
social groups is subject to change (Zarsky, 2014). For example, under US law, genetic
information was only designated as a protected feature3 in 2008 (Green et al., 2015).
Not all domains are regulated. Not all application domains in a society are regulated
by anti-discrimination laws. For example, under the US law, the regulated domains are
credit, education, employment, housing, public accommodation and marketing (Barocas
and Hardt, 2017). Furthermore, the designation of protected groups may also vary across
various domains. For example, under the US anti-discrimination law, health insurers
2While legal literature refers to salient social groups as “protected groups” (Barocas and Selbst, 2016),
some studies in machine learning literature also refer to them as “sensitive feature groups” (Pedreschi
et al., 2008). Thus, we will be using the terms salient social group, protected group and sensitive feature group
interchangeably.
3We refer to the features or traits that form the basis of protected groups (e.g., the feature race forms the
groups: African-American, Hispanic, ...) as socially salient group memberships, protected features or sensitive
features.
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are prohibited from discriminating based on genetic information, but no such provision
exists with respect to gender, race or religion (Avraham et al., 2014; GINA, 2008).
Discrimination involves groups. A point worth mentioning at this stage is that the
phenomenon of discrimination by definition involves having discernible groups. For
example, an employer putting applicants at relative disadvantage arbitrarily (without
regard to their salient social group membership) might be unfair to the applicants in
question, but (s)he will not be committing discrimination. Such scenarios involving
individual-level fairness have previously been considered in moral philosophy (Rawls,
2009) as well as in machine learning (Dwork et al., 2012; Joseph et al., 2016; Speicher
et al., 2018). On a high-level, these individual-level fairness notions require that all
individuals at the same level of qualification (regardless of their group membership)
should be treated similarly.
The wrongs of arbitrary rejections vs. the discriminatory rejections (based on salient
social groups) are different. According to Arneson (2015): “Whereas being the object
of discrimination because one belongs to a group that has been targeted for oppressive
treatment in the past is likely to be a wound to one’s sense of dignity and self-respect,
being the victim of whimsical or idiosyncratic hiring practices is less likely to inflict a
significant psychic wound over and above the loss of the job itself. Also, since whimsical
discrimination is idiosyncratic, it will not lead to cumulative harm by causing anyone to
be the object of economic discrimination time after time (unless whimsical hiring were
common and one were extremely unlucky)”.
For further discussion into the concept of discrimination (and related ideas), we
point the interested reader to Altman (2016) and Arneson (2015) and references therein.
2.2 Measures of discrimination in legal domains
Having analyzed the definition of discrimination in Section 2.1, the question that arises
now is, how does one operationalize this definition? That is, how does one empirically
measure if a (algorithmic) decision making system is discriminatory? Recall from Sec-
tion 2.1 that in measuring discrimination, our aim is to see if a decision making system
imposes wrongful relative disadvantage on certain socially salient groups.
Since much of the work in discrimination-aware machine learning until now has been
inspired by anti-discrimination legislation, we now briefly survey how discrimination
is measured in various legal systems. Specifically, our goal will be to understand how
anti-discrimination laws interpret wrongful relative disadvantage in the definition of
discrimination in Section 2.1.
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For the sake of conciseness, we will mostly focus on anti-discrimination legislation
from the US and the EU. Our terminology will be driven by the US anti-discrimination
laws, and we will mention the terminology used in the EU law whenever significant
differences arise. For a more detailed account into the discussion that follows, we
point the reader to (Altman, 2016; Bagenstos, 2015; Barocas and Selbst, 2016; FDIC’s
Compliance Examination Manual, 2017; Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010; Gano, 2017; Romei
and Ruggieri, 2014; Siegel, 2014).
Anti-discrimination laws mostly differentiate between two distinct forms of discrim-
ination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
2.2.1 Disparate treatment
This measure is referred to as “direct discrimination” under the EU law (Fribergh and
Kjaerum, 2010).
What constitutes disparate treatment?
According Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964, a decision making process suffers
from disparate treatment if it: (i) explicitly or formally considers the sensitive group
membership of a person in question, or (ii) it bases the decisions on some other factors
with the intent to discriminate against certain groups (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). EU law
also defines disparate treatment in a similar way (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010).
The specification above raises the following interesting points.
Once a decision maker explicitly considers the protected ground (e.g., gender) in
making the decision, even if the protected group membership has minimal impact on the
decisions—perhaps because other (non-protected) features carried higher weight—this
would still count as disparate treatment (Barocas and Selbst, 2016).
Also, a decision maker could implicitly base the decisions on sensitive features. For
example, under the redlining practice in the US, a lender would deny credit to residence
of certain neighborhoods based on the racial makeup of that neighborhood (Barocas
and Selbst, 2016; Gano, 2017). This case would also count as disparate treatment since
the lender’s decision to not issue credit is based on racial profiling of the neighborhood
rather than considering the merits of individuals living in that neighborhood. According
to Barocas and Selbst (2016): “Redlining is illegal because it can systematically discount
entire areas composed primarily of members of a protected class, despite the presence of
some qualified candidates.”
Finally, under certain circumstances, it may be permissible to base decisions on the
protected group membership information.
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For example, under Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer can
justify using the protected group membership information when it qualifies as a “Bona
fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) for the job under consideration (Berman, 2000).
A sensitive feature can be considered a BFOQ when it is “reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business”. For example, due to safety reasons,
mandatory retirement ages can be enforced on airline pilots or air traffic controllers since
age is a BFOQ for these jobs (Altman, 2016).
Similarly, use of sensitive features in decision making could be permitted when the
goal is to advance a compelling governmental interest (e.g., affirmative action policies
aimed at improving racial diversity in colleges). However, as MacCarthy (2017) notes,
such scenarios (where sensitive features such as race are explicitly used in decision
making) would likely be subject to strict judicial scrutiny by the courts, and would need
to satisfy certain stringent criteria to pass the strict scrutiny test.
How is disparate treatment detected?
We briefly discuss how disparate treatment is detected in the legal domain, since this
discussion would be useful in the later part of the thesis (Sections 2.4 and Chapter 7). In
the discussion that follows, the plaintiff refers to the party that lodges a discrimination
complaint before a court (e.g., a potential employee who was rejected) and the defendant
refers to the party against whom the case is lodged (e.g., the employer).
A disparate treatment liability can be established in two different ways:
The first method is where the plaintiff can show direct evidence that the protected
group membership was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision, e.g., a bar
advertising publicly that they do not serve certain minorities (Altman, 2016).
The plaintiff can show indirect evidence of discrimination. Under US legal system,
this is done via McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting scheme or Price-Waterhouse mixed motive
regime (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Gano, 2017), whereas under EU law, a comparator
framework is used (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010). Roughly, this method requires the
plaintiff to show that the action to reject the plaintiff could not have been taken had
the defendant not taken the sensitive group membership into account, i.e., the plaintiff
would not have received the negative outcome had their sensitive group membership
been different (e.g., had she been White and not African-American).
Finally, under the US anti-discrimination doctrine, while many sources argue that
disparate treatment always corresponds to intentional discrimination—i.e., the decision
maker knowingly basing decisions on the protected group membership of a person
(either directly, or via a proxy) (Federal Reserve, 2016; Gano, 2017; Gold, 2004)—others
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argue that disparate treatment may very well stem unintentionally, e.g., from unconscious
biases (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Krieger and Fiske, 2006). However, as Barocas and Selbst
(2016) note, “the law does not adequately address unconscious disparate treatment”, and
it is not entirely clear how such cases would be addressed.4 On the other hand, the EU
law does not require the presence of intent in order to establish a disparate treatment
liability (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010; Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, 2014).
2.2.2 Disparate impact
This measure is referred to as “indirect discrimination” under the EU law (Fribergh and
Kjaerum, 2010).
What constitutes disparate impact?
Under both US and EU laws, disparate impact occurs when “facially neutral” decision
making (e.g., a hiring exam) results in disproportionately adverse impact on a certain
protected group (Barocas and Selbst, 2016).
Adverse impact here is said to occur when the success rates for persons from dif-
ferent groups (e.g., African-Americans vs. Whites) are substantially different. How
different is “substantially different” is often determined on a case-by-case basis in the
EU law (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010). The same holds true for the US justice system.
However, as a rough guideline in the hiring domain, the US Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission suggests having an impact ratio between the two groups to be no
less than 80% (Biddle, 2005). As an example, a scenario where 50% of White applicants
get hired, whereas only 10% of African-American applicants get accepted, the impact
ratio is 10
50
= 0.2.
It is vital to note that disproportionally adverse impact does not automatically
constitute a disparate impact liability. Both US and EU legislations accommodate a
business necessity defense that can justify the adverse impact. For more details regarding
this justification, we next describe how a disparate impact liability is established.
How is disparate impact detected?
Under the US judicial system, the process of establishing a disparate impact liability
proceeds as follows (Barocas and Selbst, 2016): (i) The plaintiff shows that a facially
neutral decision making process (e.g., a hiring exam) led to disproportionate adverse
4As we discuss shortly in Section 2.2.2, some authors argue that the disparate impact doctrine might be
better suited to handle unconscious biases (Siegel, 2014).
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impact on the protected group. (ii) The defendant can then show that the decision
making process is related to the job and is a “business necessity”, i.e., the adverse impact
is unavoidable. (iii) The plaintiff can counter by demonstrating that the defendant could
have used an alternative decision making regime that would achieve the same outcome
utility for the defendant while having lesser adverse impact. EU courts allow a similar
business necessity defense (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010).
For example, in the US Supreme Court case Griggs vs. Duke Power Co. (Griggs, 1971),
the court was able to establish that the hiring criteria of Duke Power Co. was not job-
related, hence the adverse impact on African-Americans constituted a case of disparate
impact. On the other hand, in Ricci vs. DeStefano (Ricci, 2009), the court found no evidence
that the promotion test used by the New Haven Fire Department was not related to the
job and hence ruled that there would be no disparate impact liability.
The justification behind disparate impact as a discrimination measure
Disparate impact is known to be a highly controversial notion of discrimination with
some arguing about its validity as a suitable discrimination measure (Altman, 2016;
Barocas and Selbst, 2016).
However, Siegel (2014) notes that disparate impact can be useful as a discrimination
measure when one aims to either root out well-hidden disparate treatment (e.g., an employer
using proxies to intentionally discriminate against protected groups) or to address
unconscious and structural discrimination that can arise as a result of historical biases.
Specifically, she gives the following reasons about the effectiveness of disparate impact
as measure of discrimination.
“Why impose disparate impact liability? Judges and commentators, both
liberal and conservative, understand disparate impact liability to redress at
least three kinds of discrimination that are common in societies that have
recently repudiated centuries old traditions of discrimination.
The first is covert intentional discrimination [emphasis added]. Once a soci-
ety adopts laws prohibiting discrimination, discrimination may simply go
underground. When discrimination is hidden, it is hard to prove. Disparate
impact tests probe facially neutral practices to ensure their enforcement does
not mask covert intentional discrimination.
The second is implicit or unconscious bias [emphasis added]. Discrimination
does not end suddenly; it fades slowly. Even after a society repudiates
a system of formal hierarchy, social scientists have shown that traditional
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norms continue to shape judgments in ways that may not be perceptible
even to the decision maker herself. Disparate impact tests probe facially
neutral practices to ensure their enforcement does not reflect implicit bias or
unconscious discrimination.
The third form of bias is sometimes termed structural discrimination [emphasis
added]. An employer acting without bias may adopt a standard that has
a disparate impact on groups because the standard selects for traits whose
allocation has been shaped by past discrimination, whether practiced by the
employer or by others with whom the employer is in close dealings. Disparate
impact tests probe facially neutral practices to ensure their enforcement does
not unnecessarily perpetuate the effects of past intentional discrimination.”
Regardless, disparate impact remains a contentious measure, and its applicability is
assessed on a case-to-case basis—see for example Griggs vs. Duke Power Co. (Griggs, 1971),
Ricci vs. DeStefano (Ricci, 2009), Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs vs.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (Inclusive Communities, 2015) and Fisher vs. University
of Texas (Fisher, 2016).
In this thesis, when discussing disparate impact, we will assume that the adminis-
trator of the decision making system aims at removing substantial differences between
the beneficial outcome rates for different groups. That is, given a decision making
system where the beneficial outcome rates are different for different groups, the admin-
istrator might be interested in accessing an array of decision making outcomes, with
decreasing values of disparity in beneficial outcome rates (e.g., where the disparity in
beneficial outcome rates is 0.5, 0.4, . . ., 0.0). However, as described above, a disparity in
decision outcomes does not always generate a disparate impact liability for the system
administrator—in the case of a legitimate business necessity, the system administrator
could still justify the disparity.
Finally, somewhat related with the disparate impact doctrine is the notion of affir-
mative action (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; MacCarthy, 2017; Siegel, 2014). The goal of
affirmative action is often to correct for historical discrimination against certain groups.
Affirmative action may involve (among other things) giving preferential treatment to
these groups (e.g., by setting up quotas, giving special treatment to these groups). How-
ever, affirmative action is allowed under very special circumstances and is known to be
highly controversial (Fribergh and Kjaerum, 2010; Fullinwider, 2018).
Chapter 2. Background 14
2.2.3 How do disparate treatment and disparate impact capture wrong-
ful relative disadvantage?
The reasons for interpreting disparate treatment and disparate impact to be causing
wrongful relative disadvantage are plentiful. Here, we describe a few of these reasons. A
detailed discussion on them can be found in (Altman, 2016).
A decision making process incurring disparate treatment (i.e., intentionally basing
decisions on sensitive feature information) can be interpreted as causing wrongful
relative disadvantage since it judges people based on immutable traits that they do
not have any control over (e.g., race, national origin), and it may cause arbitrary and
inaccurate stereotyping that is not relevant to the task at hand.
Similar arguments hold for disparate impact, with the addition that disparate im-
pact also tries to capture implicit biases in the decision making process, as well as the
structural discrimination where the biased historical treatment of certain groups results
in these groups consistently getting disadvantageous outcomes in the present.
We now move on to the design of algorithmic decision making systems, and see how
disparate treatment and disparate impact are measured in the context of algorithmic
decision making.
2.3 Setup of a binary classification task
In this thesis, we focus on a specific (supervised) learning task: classification. Moreover,
we only consider binary classification tasks. The reason is as follows: discrimination
analysis often involves tasks where the outcomes are binary in nature, with a clear
distinction between a desirable (e.g., getting accepted for a job) and an undesirable (e.g.,
getting rejected from a job) outcome. However, the techniques proposed in the later
sections can be extended to m-ary classification tasks as well.
In a binary classification task, given a training set, D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, consisting of N
users, one aims at learning a mapping between user feature vectors x ∈ Rd and the class
labels y ∈ {−1, 1}. Here, one assumes that (x, y) are drawn from an unknown feature
distribution f(x, y).
Learning this mapping can be done using various methods. In this thesis, we focus
on a broad class of learning methods: convex decision boundary-based classifiers such
as logistic regression, linear and non-linear support vector machines (SVMs), etc.
Under convex boundary-based classifiers, the learning reduces to finding a decision
boundary defined by a set of parameters θ in the feature space that separates the users
in the training set according to their class labels. One typically looks for a decision
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boundary, denoted as θ∗, that minimizes a certain loss function L(θ) over the training
set, i.e., θ∗ = argminθ L(θ). For convex boundary-based classifiers, L is a convex function
of the decision boundary parameters θ, meaning that the globally optimal solution, θ∗,
can be found efficiently even for large datasets.
Then, for a given unseen feature vector x, one predicts the class label yˆ = 1 if
dθ∗(x) ≥ 0, and yˆ = 1 otherwise. Here, dθ∗(x) denotes the signed distance from x to the
decision boundary, θ∗.
We now give examples of some well-known convex boundary-based classifiers:
Logistic regression. In logistic regression (and other linear convex boundary-based
classifiers), the distance from decision boundary is denoted as dθ(x) = θTx. In other
words, the decision boundary is represented by the hyperplane θTx = 0, since we predict
yˆ = 1 if dθ(x) ≥ 0 and yˆ = 1 if dθ(x) < 0.
Next, in logistic regression, one maps the feature vectors x to the class labels y by
means of a probability distribution:
p(y = 1|x,θ) = 1
1 + e−dθ(x)
=
1
1 + e−θTx
, (2.1)
It is easy to see that a point lying at the decision boundary, i.e., with dθ(x) = 0, has
p(y = 1|x,θ) = 0.5, and this probability increases with an increase in the (signed)
distance from the boundary.
One obtains the optimal value of θ by solving the following maximum likelihood
problem over the training set (Murphy, 2012):
minimize
θ
−
∑
(x,y)∈D
log p(y|x,θ). (2.2)
Linear SVM. In the case of a linear SVM, the optimal decision boundary corresponds to
the maximum margin decision hyperplane (Bishop, 2006). This boundary is found by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
θ
‖θ‖2 + C∑Ni=1 ξi
subject to yiθTxi ≥ 1− ξi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ξi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(2.3)
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where θ and ξ are the variables. Here, minimizing ‖θ‖2 corresponds to maximizing the
margin between the support vectors assigned to the two classes, and C
∑n
i=1 ξi penalizes
the number of data points falling inside the margin.
Nonlinear SVM. In a nonlinear SVM, the decision boundary is represented by the
hyperplane θTΦ(x) = 0, where Φ(·) is a nonlinear transformation that maps every
feature vector x into a higher dimensional transformed feature space. Similar to the
case of a linear SVM, one may think of finding the parameter vector θ by solving a
constrained quadratic program. However, the dimensionality of the transformed feature
space can be large, or even infinite, making the corresponding optimization problem
difficult to solve. Fortunately, we can leverage the kernel trick (Schölkopf and Smola,
2002) and resort instead to the dual form of the problem, which can be solved efficiently.
In particular, the dual form is given by (for conciseness, we use the dual form
notation of Gentle et al. (2012)):
minimize
α
1
2
αTGα− 1Tα
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ C,
yTα = 0,
(2.4)
where α = [α1, α2, . . . , αN ]T are the dual variables, y = [y1, y2, . . . , yN ]T are the class
labels, G is the N × N Gram matrix with Gi,j = yiyjk(xi,xj), and the kernel function
k(xi,xj) = 〈φ(xi), φ(xj)〉 denotes the inner product between a pair of transformed fea-
ture vectors. The distance from decision boundary is computed as: dα(x) =
∑N
i=1 αiyik(x,xi).
Finally, the optimization problems above can be altered easily to accommodate cases
where one wants to assign different cost to different type of errors, e.g., assigning different
cost to false positives and false negatives (Bishop, 2006).
2.4 Disparate treatment and disparate impact in binary
classification
Continuing from the setup of a binary classifier in Section 2.3, we also assume that each
user feature vector x in the dataset D is accompanied by a sensitive feature z ∈ {0, 1}.5
The sensitive feature is also drawn from an unknown distribution f(z) and it may be
5Recall from Section 2.1 that we use sensitive feature, protected feature and socially salient group
membership interchangeably.
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dependent on the non-sensitive feature vectors x and class labels y, i.e., f(x, y, z) =
f(x, y|z)f(z) 6= f(x, y)f(z).
Notice that (i) we defined only one sensitive feature, and (ii) defined it to be binary.
This is merely for the sake of exposition. In the later sections, we will provide examples
of polyvalent and several sensitive features wherever necessary.
With this specification, we can formally describe the absence of disparate treatment
and disparate treatment in the outcomes of a binary classification task.
No disparate impact. A binary classifier does not suffer from disparate impact if:
P (yˆ = 1|z = 0) = P (yˆ = 1|z = 1), (2.5)
i.e., if the probability that a classifier assigns a user to the positive class yˆ = 1 is the same
for both values of the sensitive feature z, then there is no disparate impact.
No disparate treatment. Assume that x ◦ z represents the concatenation of the non-
sensitive feature vector x and the sensitive feature z. Also, with slight abuse of notation,
we assume that yˆ(x ◦ z) represents the decision of a classifier for a user with the given
non-sensitive and sensitive features.6 Then, a binary classifier does not suffer from
disparate treatment if:
yˆ(xi ◦ 0) = yˆ(xi ◦ 1) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (2.6)
i.e., if the decision of the classifier does not change with a change in the user’s sensitive
feature value, then there is no disparate treatment.
Relating our specification of disparate treatment in Eq. (2.6) to the definition of
disparate treatment in Section 2.2.1, we notice that Eq. (2.6) only accounts for scenarios
when the sensitive feature is directly used in the classification task. That is, Eq. (2.6)
would not detect scenarios when a decision maker uses a proxy feature such as location
with the intent of discriminating against a certain sensitive feature group.
The difficulty with detecting such implicit disparate treatment via proxy variables
is that in any classification task, most non-sensitive features (e.g., educational-level,
location) will likely have non-zero correlation with the sensitive feature (e.g., gender).
For example, a 2007 analysis of credit-based insurance scores by US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC, 2007) shows that a number of “informative” features are correlated
6For example, for convex boundary-based classifiers, yˆ(·) would be the sign of the distance from
decision boundary. For a decision tree classifier, this would be the label of the corresponding leaf node.
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with race. Under such situations, it is very difficult to determine whether or not the
decision maker had an intent to discriminate while using certain non-sensitive features.
To counter such scenarios, the disparate impact test (Eq. 2.5) would be a more suitable
tool to detect discrimination. In fact, as Siegel (2014) notes, one of the utilities of disparate
impact tests is to detect “covert intentional discrimination” and “probe facially neutral
practices to ensure their enforcement does not mask covert intentional discrimination”.
Having formally described disparate treatment and disparate impact in the context
of classification tasks, we now move on to design classifiers that can avoid these two
forms of discrimination.
CHAPTER 3
Classification without disparate
treatment and disparate impact
While it is desirable to design classifiers free of disparate treatment as well as disparate
impact, controlling for both forms of discrimination simultaneously is challenging. One
could avoid disparate treatment by ensuring that the decision making process does
not have access to sensitive feature information (and hence cannot make use of it).
However, ignoring the sensitive feature information may still lead to disparate impact in
outcomes: since automated decision-making systems are often trained on historical data,
if a group with a certain sensitive feature value was discriminated against in the past,
this unfairness may persist in future predictions, leading to disparate impact (Barocas
and Selbst, 2016; Dwork et al., 2012). Similarly, avoiding disparate impact in outcomes by
using sensitive feature information while making decisions would constitute disparate
treatment, and may also lead to reverse discrimination (Ricci, 2009).
In this chapter, our goal is to design classifiers—specifically, convex margin-based
classifiers like logistic regression and support vector machines (SVMs)—that avoid
both disparate treatment and disparate impact, and can additionally accommodate the
“business necessity” clause of disparate impact doctrine (Section 2.2.2). According to
the business necessity clause, an employer can justify a certain degree of disparate
impact in order to meet certain performance-related constraints (Barocas and Selbst,
2016). However, the employer needs to ensure that the current decision making incurs
the least possible disparate impact under the given constraints.
Since it is very challenging to directly incorporate the disparate impact requirement
into the design of many well-known classifiers like logistic regression or SVM, we intro-
duce a novel and intuitive mechanism of decision boundary covariance: the covariance
between the sensitive features and the signed distance between the users’ feature vectors
and the decision boundary of the classifier. The decision boundary covariance serves as
a tractable proxy for measuring and limiting the disparate impact of a classifier.
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Our covariance mechanism allows us to derive two complementary formulations for
training nondiscriminatory classifiers: one that maximizes accuracy subject to nondis-
crimination constraints, and enables compliance with disparate impact doctrine in its
basic form (i.e., ensuring parity in beneficial outcomes for different sensitive feature
groups); and another that minimizes discrimination subject to accuracy constraints, and
can help fulfill the business necessity clause of disparate impact doctrine. Remarkably,
both formulations can also avoid disparate treatment, since they do not use sensitive
feature information while making decisions, i.e., their decisions satisfy Eq. (2.6).7 Our
mechanism additionally satisfies several desirable properties: (i) for a wide variety of
convex boundary-based linear and non-linear classifiers (e.g., logistic regression, SVM),
it is convex and can be readily incorporated in their formulation without increasing
their complexity, hence ensuring efficient learning; (ii) it allows for clear mechanisms
to trade-off nondiscrimination and accuracy; and, (iii) it can be used to ensure nondis-
crimination with respect to several sensitive features. Experiments using both synthetic
and real-world data show that our mechanism allows for a fine-grained control of the
level of nondiscrimination, often at a small cost in terms of accuracy, and provides more
flexibility than the state-of-the-art.
Relevant publication
Results presented in this chapter are published in (Zafar et al., 2017b).
3.1 Methodology
First, to comply with the disparate treatment criterion in Eq. (2.6), we specify that the
sensitive feature should not be a part of the decision making process i.e., x and z consist
of disjoint feature sets.
Next, for training a classifier adhering to the disparate impact criterion in Eq. (2.5),
one can add this criterion into the classifier formulation as follows:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to P (yˆ = 1|z = 0)− P (yˆ = 1|z = 1) ≤ ,
P (yˆ = 1|z = 0)− P (yˆ = 1|z = 1) ≥ −,
(3.1)
where a smaller value of  ∈ R+ would result in a classifier more adherent to Eq. (2.5).
7As we explain shortly in Section 3.1, the sensitive feature information is needed only during the
training phase to learn nondiscriminatory classifier parameters.
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Unfortunately, it is very challenging to solve the above optimization problem for
convex boundary-based classifiers, since for many such classifiers (e.g., SVM) the proba-
bilities are a non-convex function of the classifier parameters θ and, therefore, would
lead to non-convex formulations, which are difficult to solve efficiently. Secondly, as long
as the user feature vectors lie on the same side of the decision boundary, the probabilities
are invariant to changes in the decision boundary. In other words, the probabilities are
functions having saddle points. The presence of saddle points furthers complicate the
procedure for solving non-convex optimization problems (Dauphin et al., 2014).
To overcome these challenges, we next introduce a novel measure of decision bound-
ary covariance which can be used as a proxy to efficiently design classifiers satisfying
Eq. (2.5).
Our measure of decision boundary covariance stems from the intuition that if two
groups have high disparity in their probabilities of being assigned to the positive class,
i.e., if Eq. (2.5) is far from being satisfied, then the average signed distances from decision
boundary for the two groups are also likely to be quite different from each other. Hence,
by controlling the relationship between the sensitive feature and the signed distance
from decision boundary, one could hope to limit disparate impact in the predicted labels.
We now formalize this intuition below.
3.1.1 Decision boundary covariance
Our measure of decision boundary covariance is defined as the covariance between the
users’ sensitive feature, z, and the signed distance from the users’ feature vectors to the
decision boundary, dθ(x) , i.e.:
Cov(z, dθ(x)) = E[(z − z¯)(dθ(x)− d¯θ(x))] (3.2)
= E[(z − z¯)dθ(x)− (z − z¯)d¯θ(x)]
= E[(z − z¯)dθ(x)]− E[(z − z¯)]d¯θ(x)
≈ 1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D
(z − z¯) dθ(x),
where E[(z − z¯)]d¯θ(x) cancels out since E[(z − z¯)] = 0. Since in linear models for
classification, such as logistic regression or linear SVMs, the decision boundary is simply
the hyperplane defined by θTx = 0, Eq. (3.2) reduces to 1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯)θTx.
In contrast to the probabilities in Eq. (3.1), the decision boundary covariance (Eq. (3.2))
is a convex function with respect to the decision boundary parameters θ, since dθ(xi) is
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convex with respect to θ for all linear, convex margin-based classifiers.8 Hence, it can be
easily included in the formulation of these classifiers while retaining efficient training.
Moreover, note that, if a decision boundary satisfies Eq. (2.5), then the (empirical)
covariance will be approximately zero for a sufficiently large training set.
3.1.2 Maximizing accuracy under nondiscrimination constraints
In this section, we design classifiers that maximize accuracy subject to nondiscrimination
constraints (i.e., satisfying Eq. (2.5)), and thus may be used to ensure compliance with
the disparate impact doctrine in its basic form.
To this end, we replace the probabilities in Eq. (3.1) with decision boundary covari-
ance and find the decision boundary parameters θ by minimizing the corresponding loss
function over the training set under nondiscrimination constraints, i.e.:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to 1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯) dθ(x) ≤ c,
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯) dθ(x) ≥ −c,
(3.3)
where c ∈ R+ is the covariance threshold, which specifies an upper bound on the
covariance between each sensitive feature and the signed distance from the feature
vectors to the decision boundary. In this formulation, c trades off nondiscrimination
and accuracy, such that as we decrease c towards zero, the resulting classifier will be
more compliant with Eq. (2.5) but will potentially suffer from a larger loss in accuracy.
Note that since the above optimization problem is convex, our scheme ensures that
the trade-off between the classifier loss function and decision boundary covariance is
Pareto-optimal.
Finally, for multiple sensitive features (e.g., gender, race), one can include constraints
for each sensitive feature separately. For polyvalent sensitive features having k ≥ 2 values,
one can first convert the sensitive feature into k binary sensitive features using a one hot
encoding scheme, and then add constraints for each of the k sensitive features.
Remarks. It is important to note that the distance to the margin, dθ(x), only depends on
the non-sensitive features x and, therefore, the sensitive feature z is not needed while
making decisions. In other words, we account for disparate treatment, by removing the
sensitive features from the decision making process and, for disparate impact, by adding
nondiscrimination constraints during (only) the training process of the classifier.
8For non-linear convex margin-based classifiers like non-linear SVM, equivalent of dθ(xi) is still convex
in the transformed kernel space.
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Next, we specialize problem (3.3) for a logistic regression and a non-linear SVM
classifier.
Logistic Regression without disparate impact. Continuing from the setup of a logistic
regression classifier in Section 2.3, one can modify it to add disparate impact constraints
as follows:
minimize
θ
−∑(x,y)∈D log p(y|x,θ) } Logistic regression formulation
subject to 1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯)θTx ≤ c,
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯)θTx ≥ −c.
}
Disparate impact constraints (3.4)
Linear SVM without disparate impact. The formulation of the linear SVM classifier in
Section 2.3 can be extended to include disparate impact constraints as follows:
minimize
θ
‖θ‖2 + C∑ni=1 ξi
subject to yiθTxi ≥ 1− ξi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ξi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
 SVM formulation
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (zi − z¯)θTxi ≤ c,
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (zi − z¯)θTxi ≥ −c,
}
Disparate impact constraints (3.5)
Non-linear SVM without disparate impact. One can extend the formulation of non-
linear SVM in Eq. 2.4 to include the disparate impact constraints. Specifically, one can
use the kernel trick in the constraints as well:
minimize
α
1
2
αTGα− 1Tα
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ C,
yTα = 0,
 SVM formulation
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯) dα(x) ≤ c,
1
N
∑
(x,z)∈D (z − z¯) dα(x) ≥ −c,
} Disparate impact
constraints (3.6)
where dα(x) =
∑N
i=1 αiyik(x,xi) can still be interpreted as the signed distance from
decision boundary (Schölkopf and Smola, 2002).
3.1.3 Minimizing disparate impact under accuracy constraints
In the previous section, we designed classifiers that maximize accuracy subject to nondis-
crimination constraints. However, if the underlying correlation between the class labels
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and the sensitive features in the training set is very high, enforcing nondiscrimination
constraints may result in underwhelming performance (accuracy) and thus be unac-
ceptable in terms of business objectives. Disparate impact’s “business necessity” clause
accounts for such scenarios by allowing some degree of disparate impact in order to
meet performance constraints. However, the employer needs to ensure that the decision
making causes least possible disparate impact under the given performance (accuracy)
constraints (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). To accommodate such scenarios, we now propose
an alternative formulation that minimizes discrimination (disparate impact) subject to
accuracy constraints.
To this aim, we find the decision boundary parameters θ by minimizing the corre-
sponding (absolute) decision boundary covariance over the training set under constraints
on the classifier loss function, i.e.:
minimize
θ
∣∣∣ 1N ∑(x,z)∈D (z − z¯) dθ(x)∣∣∣
subject to L(θ) ≤ (1 + γ)L(θ∗),
(3.7)
where L(θ∗) denotes the optimal loss over the training set provided by the unconstrained
classifier and γ ≥ 0 specifies the maximum additional loss with respect to the loss pro-
vided by the unconstrained classifier. Here, we can ensure maximum nondiscrimination
with no loss in accuracy by setting γ = 0. As in Section 3.1.2, it is possible to specialize
problem (3.7) for the same classifiers and show that the formulation remains convex.
Fine-grained accuracy constraints. In many classifiers, including logistic regression and
SVMs, the loss function (or the dual of the loss function) is additive over the points in the
training set, i.e., L(θ) =
∑N
i=1 Li(θ), where Li(θ) is the individual loss associated with
the i-th point in the training set. Moreover, the individual loss Li(θ) typically tells us
how close the predicted label f(xi) is to the true label yi, by means of the signed distance
to the decision boundary. Therefore, one may think of incorporating loss constraints for
a certain set of users, and consequently, prevent individual users originally classified
as positive (by the unconstrained classifier) from being classified as negative by the
constrained classifier. To do so, we find the decision boundary parameters θ as:
minimize
θ
| 1
N
∑N
i=1 (zi − z¯) dθ(xi)|
subject to Li(θ) ≤ (1 + γi)Li(θ∗) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3.8)
where Li(θ∗) is the individual loss associated to the i-th user in the training set provided
by the unconstrained classifier and γi ≥ 0 is her allowed additional loss.
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The constraints in Eq. 3.8 can also help ensure that there are no egregious misclassifi-
cations while adding nondiscrimination requirements into the classifier training.
3.2 Evaluation
In this section, we experiment with several synthetic and real-world datasets to evaluate
the effectiveness of our decision boundary covariance in controlling disparate treatment
and disparate impact.
Across this section, we quantify disparate impact (Eq. 2.5) as the absolute difference
between the positive class probability for the sensitive feature groups with z = 0 and
z = 1, as in various prior studies, (Calders and Verwer, 2010; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017b;
Menon and Williamson, 2017), i.e.:
DI =
∣∣∣P (yˆ = 1|z = 0)− P (yˆ = 1|z = 1)∣∣∣, (3.9)
where a value of DI closer to zero denotes a smaller degree of disparate impact.
Some studies also adopt another measure of disparate impact, the p-rule. This
measure quantifies the differences between positive class probabilities for the two groups
using ratios instead of differences.9 However, as the publication corresponding to this
chapter shows (Zafar et al., 2017b), using p-rule as a measure of disparate impact leads
to very similar experimental insights.
3.2.1 Synthetic datasets
To simulate different degrees of disparate impact in classification outcomes, we generate
two synthetic datasets with different levels of correlation between a single, binary sensi-
tive feature and class labels. We then train two types of logistic regression classifiers: one
type maximizes accuracy subject to disparate impact constraints (Section 3.1.2), and the
other minimizes disparate impact under fine-grained accuracy constraints (Section 3.1.3).
Specifically, we generate 4,000 binary class labels uniformly at random and assign
a 2-dimensional user feature vector per label by drawing samples from two different
9 The p-rule is defined as: min(P (yˆ=1|z=0)P (yˆ=1|z=1) ,
P (yˆ=1|z=1)
P (yˆ=1|z=0) ). This measure is inspired by the guidelines by the
US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission stating that the acceptance ratios between the protected
and non-protected groups should be no less than 0.8. However, courts in Europe have been known to
use the difference instead of the ratios (Bernard and Hepple, 1999). Since both p-rule and Eq. (3.9) are
designed to quantify significant disparities in acceptance rates, we expect both of them to convey similar
insights (barring corner cases, such as, when the acceptance rates are very close to 0 or very close to 1.0).
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Acc=0.87; AR=0.33:0.74
Acc=0.82; AR=0.44:0.62
Acc=0.74; AR=0.50:0.51
(a) φ = pi/4
Acc=0.87; AR=0.21:0.87
Acc=0.71; AR=0.38:0.62
Acc=0.60; AR=0.47:0.46
(b) φ = pi/8
Figure 3.1: [Synthetic data: Maximizing accuracy subject to disparate impact constraints]
Performance of different (unconstrained and constrained) classifiers along
with their accuracy (Acc) and positive class acceptance rates (AR) for groups
z = 0 (crosses) and z = 1 (circles). Green points represent examples with
y = 1 and red points represent example with y = −1. The solid lines show
the decision boundaries for logistic regression classifiers without disparate
impact constraints. The dashed lines show the decision boundaries for logistic
regression classifiers trained to maximize accuracy under disparate impact
constraints (Eq. (3.4)). Each column corresponds to a dataset with different
correlation value between sensitive feature values and class labels. Lowering
the covariance threshold c towards zero lowers the degree of disparate impact,
but causes a greater loss in accuracy. Furthermore, for the dataset with higher
correlation between the sensitive feature and class labels (pi/8), the loss in
accuracy is greater.
Gaussian distributions:
p(x|y = 1) = N ([2; 2], [5, 1; 1, 5])
p(x|y = −1) = N ([−2;−2], [10, 1; 1, 3]).
Then, we draw each user’s sensitive feature z from a Bernoulli distribution: p(z = 1) =
p(x′|y = 1)/(p(x′|y = 1) + p(x′|y = −1)), where x′ = [cos(φ), − sin(φ); sin(φ), cos(φ)]x is
simply a rotated version of the feature vector, x. We generate two datasets with different
values for the parameter φ (pi/4 and pi/8), which controls the correlation between the
sensitive feature, z, and the class labels, y (and in turn, the resulting degree of disparate
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Acc=0.87; AR=0.33:0.74
Acc=0.78; AR=0.63:0.84
Acc=0.64; AR=0.84:0.91
(a) φ = pi/4
Acc=0.87; AR=0.21:0.87
Acc=0.78; AR=0.52:0.96
Acc=0.53; AR=0.98:1.00
(b) φ = pi/8
Figure 3.2: [Synthetic data: Minimizing disparate impact subject to fine-grained accuracy
constraints] The dashed lines show the decision boundaries for logistic re-
gression classifiers trained to minimize disparate impact with constraints that
prevents users with z = 1 (circles) labeled as positive by the unconstrained
classifier from being moved into the negative class in the process (Eq. (3.8)).
As compared to the previous experiment in Figure 3.1, the constrained clas-
sifier now leads to a rotations as well as shifts in the unconstrained decision
boundaries (in order to prevent the specified points from being classified into
the negative class).
impact). Here, the closer φ is to zero, the higher the correlation between z and y, and
hence, the higher the degree of disparate impact.
Next, we train logistic regression classifiers optimizing for accuracy on both the
datasets. The accuracy of the classifiers in both cases is 0.87 (note that the datasets
only differ in terms of the correlation between z and y). However, the classifiers lead
to DI = |0.33 − 0.74| = 0.41 and DI = |0.21 − 0.87| = 0.66 on datasets with φ = pi/4
and φ = pi/8, respectively. To overcome this discrimination, we train logistic regression
classifiers with disparate impact constraints (Eq. 3.4) on both datasets.
Figure 3.1 shows the decision boundaries provided by the classifiers for two (succes-
sively decreasing) covariance thresholds, c. We compare these boundaries against the
unconstrained decision boundary (solid line). As expected, given the data generation
process, the disparate impact constraints map into a rotation of the decision boundary
(dashed lines), which is greater as we decrease threshold value c or increase the corre-
lation in the original data (from φ = pi/4 to φ = pi/8). This movement of the decision
boundaries shows that our disparate impact constraints are successfully undoing (albeit
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in a highly controlled setting) the rotations we used to induce disparate impact in the
dataset. Moreover, a smaller covariance threshold (a larger rotation) leads to a more
nondiscriminatory solution, although, it comes at a larger cost in accuracy.
Figure 3.2 shows the decision boundaries provided by the classifiers that minimize
disparate impact under fine-grained accuracy constraints (Eq. (3.8)). Here, the fine-
grained accuracy constraints ensure that the users with z = 1 classified as positive by the
unconstrained classifier (circles above the solid line) are not labeled as negative by the
constrained classifier. The decision boundaries provided by this formulation, in contrast
to the previous one, are rotated and shifted versions of the unconstrained boundary. Such
shifts enable the constrained classifiers to avoid negatively classifying users specified in
the constraints.
Next, we illustrate how the decision boundary of a non-linear classifier, a SVM with
radial basis function (RBF) kernel, changes under disparate impact constraints (Eq. (3.6)).
To this end, we generate 4,000 user binary class labels uniformly at random and assign a
2-dimensional user feature vector per label by drawing samples from
p(x|y = 1, β) = βN ([2; 2], [5 1; 1 5]) + (1− β)N ([−2;−2], [10 1; 1 3])
p(x|y = −1, β) = βN ([4;−4], [4 4; 2 5]) + (1− β)N ([−4; 6], [6 2; 2 3])
where β ∈ {0, 1} is sampled from Bernoulli(0.5). Then, we generate each user’s sensitive
feature z by applying the same rotation as described earlier.
Figure 3.3 shows the decision boundaries provided by the SVM that maximizes
accuracy under disparate impact constraints with c = 0 for two different correlation
values: φ = pi/4 and φ = pi/8, in comparison with the unconstrained SVM. We observe
that, in this case, the decision boundaries provided by the constrained SVMs are very
different to the decision boundary provided by the unconstrained SVM, and are not just
simple shifts or rotations of the latter.
3.2.2 Real-world datasets
We now evaluate the effectiveness of our covariance framework in removing disparate
impact on real-world datasets. In doing so, we also compare the performance of our
framework to several methods from the non-discriminatory machine learning literature.
In all the experiments, to obtain more reliable estimates of accuracy and disparate
impact, we repeatedly split each dataset into a train (70%) and test (30%) set 5 times and
report the average statistics for accuracy and disparate impact.
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Acc=0.94; AR=0.28:0.66(pi/4),0.11:0.85(pi/8)
(a) Unconstrained
Acc=0.83; AR=0.55:0.57
(b) φ = pi/4
Acc=0.56; AR=0.45:0.37
(c) φ = pi/8
Figure 3.3: [Synthetic data: Maximizing accuracy subject to disparate impact constraints] Decision boundaries for SVM classifier
with RBF Kernel trained without disparate impact constraints (left) and with disparate impact constraints (middle
and right) on two synthetic datasets. Also shown are the classification accuracy (Acc) and acceptance rate (AR) for
each group. The decision boundaries for the constrained classifier are not just the rotated and shifted version of the
unconstrained classifier.
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Datasets and Experimental Setup
Here, we experiment with two real-world datasets: The Adult income dataset (Adult,
1996) and the Bank marketing dataset (Bank, 2014).
The Adult dataset contains a total of 45,222 subjects, each with 14 features (e.g.,
age, educational level) and a binary label, which indicates whether a subject’s annual
income is above (positive class) or below (negative class) 50K USD. With the aim of
experimenting with binary as well as non-binary (polyvalent) sensitive features, we
consider the features gender and race to be sensitive. Here, gender (with feature values:
men and women) serves as an example of binary sensitive feature and race (with feature
values: American-Indian, Asian, Black, White and Other) serves as an example of a
non-binary sensitive feature.
The Bank dataset contains a total of 41,188 subjects, each with 20 features (e.g.,
marital status) and a binary label, which indicates whether the client has subscribed
(positive class) or not (negative class) to a term deposit. In this case, we consider age as
(binary) sensitive feature, which is discretized to indicate whether or not the client’s age
is between 25 and 60 years.
For detailed statistics about the distribution of different sensitive features in positive
class in these datasets, we refer the reader to Appendix A.
For the sake of conciseness, while presenting the results for binary sensitive features,
we refer to women and men, respectively, as protected and non-protected groups in
Adult data. Similarly, in Bank data, we refer to users between age 25 and 60 as protected
and rest of the users as non-protected group.
Methods
In our experiments, we also compare our approach to well-known competing method
from discrimination-aware machine learning literature (detailed in Chapter 6). More
specifically, we consider the following methods:
• Our method (C-LR and C-SVM): Implements our covariance constraints-based
methods for controlling disparate impact with a logistic regression classifier (Eq. (3.4))
and a dual-form SVM classifier with a linear kernel (Eq. (3.6)). On the datasets
considered here, different choices of kernel (linear vs. RBF) lead to a very similar
performance in terms of accuracy and disparate impact. This method does not use
the sensitive feature information at decision time.
• Preferential sampling (PS-LR and PS-SVM): Implements the data pre-processing
technique of Kamiran and Calders (2010) on a logistic regression and a SVM
classifier. Specifically, this method operates as follows: (i) We first train a standard
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Figure 3.4: [Real-world data: Maximizing accuracy subject to disparate impact con-
straints on a single, binary sensitive feature] Panels in the top row show the
trade-off between the empirical covariance in Eq. (3.2) and the relative loss
(with respect to the unconstrained classifier), for the Adult (left) and Bank
(right) datasets. Here each pair of (covariance, loss) values is guaranteed
to be Pareto optimal by construction. Panels in the bottom row show the
correspondence between the empirical covariance and disparate impact in
Eq. (3.9) for classifiers trained under disparate impact constraints. The figure
shows that a decreasing empirical covariance leads to higher loss but lower
disparate impact.
(potentially discriminatory) classifier on the given dataset. (ii) Next, we move /
replicate the protected group data points to / on the positive side of the decision
boundary (and vice versa for the non-protected group) until the decision boundary
leads to zero disparate impact, i.e., until it satisfies Eq. (2.5). (iii) We then train the
final (non-discriminatory) classifier on the perturbed dataset. This method does
not use the sensitive feature information at decision time.
• Regularized logistic regression (R-LR): The in-processing regularized logistic re-
gression technique of Kamishima et al. (2011). This technique is only limited to
the logistic regression classification model. This technique works by adding a
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regularization term in the objective function that penalizes the mutual information
between the sensitive feature and the classifier decisions. This technique needs
the sensitive feature information at decision time, hence cannot remove disparate
treatment.
• Post-Processing (PP-LR and PP-SVM): The post-processing technique discussed
in Corbett-Davies et al. (2017b). This method works by training a standard logistic
regression or SVM classifier on the given dataset. It then finds a pair of acceptance
thresholds10 such that the decisions based on those thresholds lead to maximum
accuracy while having no disparate impact. This technique also requires the
sensitive feature information at decision time so it cannot avoid disparate treatment.
Results
First, we experiment with two standard (unconstrained) logistic regression and SVM
classifiers. In the Adult dataset, the logistic regression classifier leads to an accuracy of
0.846. However, the classifier results in highly disparate positive class acceptance rates
for protected and non-protected groups: 0.08 and 0.26. The SVM classifier leads to a
similar accuracy (0.847) and disparity in positive class acceptance rates (0.08 vs 0.25). In
the Bank dataset, the two classifiers lead to accuracies of 0.911 and 0.910, respectively,
and acceptance rates of 0.06 vs. 0.25, and 0.05 vs. 0.23 respectively. The high disparity in
acceptance rates over the two datasets clearly constitutes a case of disparate impact.
We then apply our framework to eliminate disparate impact with respect to a single
binary sensitive feature, gender and age, for respectively, the Adult and Bank datasets.
For each dataset, we train several logistic regression and SVM classifiers (denoted by
‘C-LR’ and ‘C-SVM’, respectively), each subject to disparate impact constraints with
different values of covariance threshold, c (Eqs.(3.4, 3.6)). Next, we study the effect of
covariance constraints on the loss function value, level of disparate impact and accuracy
of the classifier.
Figure 3.4 (top row) shows the empirical decision boundary covariance against the
relative loss incurred by the classifier. The ‘relative loss’ is normalized between the loss
incurred by an unconstrained classifier and by the classifier with a covariance threshold
of 0. We notice that as expected, a decreasing value of empirical covariance results in
an increasing loss. However, each pair of (covariance, loss) values is guaranteed to be
Pareto optimal, since our problem formulation is convex. The bottom row in Figure 3.4
investigates the correspondence between decision boundary covariance and disparate
impact (Eq. (3.9)) computed on the training set, showing that, as desired: i) the lower the
10The acceptance threshold is 0 for a standard logistic regression or SVM classifier.
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Figure 3.5: [Real-world data: Maximizing accuracy subject to disparate impact con-
straints on a single, binary sensitive feature] The figure shows the accuracy
against disparate impact in Eq. 3.9 (top) and the percentage of protected
(dashed) and non-protected (solid) users in the positive class against the
disparate impact value (bottom). For all methods, a decreasing degree of
disparate impact also leads to a decreasing accuracy. The post-processing
technique (PP-LR and PP-SVM) achieves the best disparate impact-accuracy
tradeoff. However, this technique as well as R-LR use the sensitive feature in-
formation at decision time (as opposed to C-LR, C-SVM, PS-LR and PS-SVM),
and would hence lead to a violation of disparate treatment (Eq. 2.6).
covariance, the lower the disparate impact of the classifier and (ii) 0 disparate impact
maps to roughly zero covariance.
We next compare the performance of our constrained classifiers in terms of disparate
impact–accuracy tradeoffs with the baselines methods mentioned above. The results
presented in Figure 3.5, top row, show that: i) the performance of our classifiers (C-LR,
C-SVM) and regularized logistic regression (R-LR) is comparable, ours are slightly better
for Adult data (left column) while slightly worse for Bank data (right column); ii) the
preferential sampling presents the worst performance and results in high disparate
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impact; and, (iii) the post-processing technique leads to the best performance among
all methods. However, we note that both R-LR and PP-LR / PP-SVM use the sensitive
feature information at the decision time while the other two techniques do not.
For a more fair comparison, we also train our method with access to sensitive features
at decision time. Specifically, we train constrained logistic regression classifiers (C-LR)
under the same setup as above, with the exception that the non-sensitive (x) and sensitive
features (z) are not disjoint feature sets—that is, the classifier learns a non-zero weight
for the sensitive feature z.
Under this setup, on the Adult dataset, our constrained logistic regression classifier
(C-LR) achieves an accuracy of 0.839 and DI of 0.09, as compared to 0.828 accuracy and
0.01 DI achieved by the PP-LR classifier. In this case C-LR achieves a better accuracy than
PP-LR, but does not remove DI as well as PP-LR. Next, we adjust the thresholds of PP-LR
in a way that the resulting classifier has DI ≤ 0.9 (i.e., it tries to match the DI of C-LR)
while maximizing accuracy. Under these thresholds, PP-LR achieves an accuracy of 0.840
and DI of 0.07. On the Bank dataset, C-LR achieves an accuracy of 0.908 (0.909 for PP-LR)
and DI of 0.01 (0.0 for PP-LR). On both Bank and Adult datasets, both methods achieve
similar accuracy for a similar level of DI (with PP-LR performing marginally better).
The bottom row of Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of users from protected and
non-protected groups in the positive class along with the degree of disparate impact. We
note that in the Adult data, all classifiers move non-protected users (men) to the negative
class and protected users (women) to the positive class to remove disparate impact.
In contrast, in the Bank data, they only move non-protected (young and old) users
originally labeled as positive to the negative class since it provides a smaller accuracy
loss. However, the latter can be problematic: from a business perspective, a bank may be
interested in finding potential subscribers rather than losing existing customers. This
observation could motivate the business necessity clause of the disparate impact doctrine.
To counter such situations, one can use our alternative formulation in Section 3.1.3. We
experiment with this formulation later in this section.
Finally, we apply our framework to eliminate disparate impact with respect to non-
binary (race) and several (gender and race) sensitive features in the Adult dataset. We do
not compare with competing methods since the pre-propressing and in-processing meth-
ods described above cannot handle non-binary or several sensitive features, whereas
the post-processing technique—which involves trying various combinations of sensi-
tive feature group-conditional thresholds—can become unscalable with an increase in
number of groups. Figure 3.6 summarizes the results by showing the accuracy and the
percentage of subjects sharing each sensitive feature value classified as positive against a
multiplicative covariance factor a ∈ [0, 1] such that c = ac∗, where c∗ is the unconstrained
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Figure 3.6: [Real-world data: Maximizing accuracy subject to disparate impact con-
straints on a polyvalent (left) and multiple (right) sensitive features] The
figure shows accuracy (top) and percentage of users in positive class (bottom)
against a multiplicative factor a ∈ [0, 1] such that c = ac∗, where c∗ denotes
the unconstrained classifier covariance. Reducing the covariance threshold
leads to outcomes with less and less disparate impact, but causes further
drops in accuracy.
classifier covariance11 (note that disparate impact in Eq. (3.9) is only defined for a binary
sensitive feature). As expected, as the value of c decreases, the percentage of subjects in
the positive class from sensitive feature value groups become nearly equal 12 while the
loss in accuracy is modest.
Disparate impact’s business necessity clause. We now experiment with our formula-
tion for handling the business necessity clause (Section 3.1.3) to avoid scenarios where
removing disparate impact leads to almost all the users being assigned the negative
class label (Figure 3.5). Specifically, we demonstrate that our formulation in Section 3.1.3
11For several sensitive features, we compute the initial covariance c∗k for each of the sensitive feature k,
and then compute the covariance threshold separately for each sensitive feature as ac∗k.
12With the exception of the race ‘Other’. We note that this ‘Other’ constitutes a very small part of the
whole data (0.8%) and among other factors, this exception could have been caused by the inaccurate
estimation of decision boundary covariance due to sparse representation of this group.
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Figure 3.7: [Minimizing disparate impact subject to constraints on accuracy, or on −ve
class classification for certain points] Panels in top row show the accuracy
(solid) and disparate impact (dashed) against γ. Panels in the bottom row
show the percentage of protected (P, dashed) and non-protected (N-P, solid)
users in the positive class against γ. Allowing for more loss in accuracy
results in a solution with less disparate impact.
can minimize disparate impact while precisely controlling loss in accuracy. We also
demonstrate that our formulation can additionally provide guarantees for classifying
certain users in the positive class while minimizing disparate impact.
To this end, we first train several logistic regression classifiers (denoted by ‘γ-LR’),
which minimize the decision boundary covariance subject to accuracy constraints over
the entire dataset by solving problem (3.7) with increasing values of γ. Then, we train
logistic regression classifiers (denoted by ‘Fine-γ-LR’) that minimize the decision bound-
ary covariance subject to fine-grained accuracy constraints by solving problem (3.8). Here,
we prevent the non-protected users that were classified as positive by the unconstrained
logistic regression classifier from being classified as negative by constraining that their
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distance from decision boundary stays positive while learning the nondiscriminatory
boundary. We then increase γi = γ for the remaining users. In both cases, we increased
the value of γ until we reach 0 disparate impact during training. Figure 3.7 summarizes
the results for both datasets, by showing (a) the average accuracy (solid curves) and
disparate impact (dashed curves) against γ, and (b) the percentage of non-protected
(N-P, solid curves) and protected (P, dashed curves) users in the positive class against
γ. We observe that, as we increase γ, the classifiers that constrain the overall training
loss (γ-LR) remove non-protected users from the positive class and add protected users
to the positive class, in contrast, the classifiers that prevent the non-protected users
that were classified as positive in the unconstrained classifier from being classified as
negative (Fine-γ-LR) add both protected and non-protected users to the positive class.
As a consequence, the latter achieves lower accuracy for the same value of disparate
impact.
3.3 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced a novel measure of decision boundary covariance, which
enables us to ensure nondiscrimination with respect to one or more sensitive features, in
terms of both disparate treatment and disparate impact, in a variety of linear and non-
linear classifiers. We leverage this measure to derive two complementary formulations:
one that maximizes accuracy subject to disparate impact constraints, and helps ensure
compliance with a non-discrimination policy or law (e.g., limiting disparity in positive
class outcome rates between the groups below a certain threshold); and another one
that minimized disparate impact subject to accuracy constraints, and ensures fulfilling
certain business needs (e.g., disparate impact’s business necessity clause).
Comparison with related techniques reveal that our method provides an accuracy
comparable to that of other methods for the same degree of disparate impact. Moreover,
as compared to the post-processing technique, our method provides an additional flex-
ibility that it can also operate without access to the sensitive feature at decision time.
One could potentially “combine” the preferential sampling and the post-processing tech-
niques by learning optimal group-conditional thresholds for removing disparate impact
on the training dataset, re-labeling the training dataset according to these thresholds,
and then training an accuracy-maximizing classifier on the relabeled dataset. Such a
strategy could relax the post-processing technique’s requirement of having access to the
sensitive feature at decision time. Analysis of such combined techniques would be an
interesting avenue for future work.
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Figure 3.8: Covariance constraints may perform unfavorably in the presence of outliers.
The figure shows a hypothetical dataset with just one feature (x) with values
ranging form −5 to 5. Data points belong to two groups: men (M) or women
(W). Each box shows the number of subjects of from a certain group (M or
W) with that feature value. The decision boundary is at x = 0. The decision
boundary covariance in this case is 0, yet the disparity in positive class
outcome rates between men and women (0.5 for men and 0.17 for women) is
very high. This situation is caused by one woman with feature value 5—this
outlier point cancels out the effect of five normal examples (W with feature
value −1) while computing the covariance.
On the negative side, we note that, as opposed to the post-processing scheme,
our method does not always fully remove disparate impact, i.e., it does not always
drive the disparity in acceptance rates close to zero. Such situations can arise due
to various reasons. First, since our mechanisms relies on empirically estimating the
decision boundary covariance, very small presence of a certain group in the dataset can
lead to poor estimate of the covariance and might not fully remove disparate impact.
Furthermore, while the post-processing schemes to remove disparate impact operate
on the data of dimensionality 1 (that is, the scalar score assigned to each item by the
classifier), our method operates by using all the features used in classification in order to
compute the decision boundary covariance. As a result, our method is expected to suffer
more from the data sparsity problem.
We also notice that our method might not perform well in the presence of outliers.
Consider for instance the example shown in Figure 3.8, where an outlier point causes the
decision boundary covariance to be 0, even when the disparity in positive class outcomes
caused by the corresponding decision boundary is very high. However, such outliers
can in fact deteriorate the performance of any learning task (Bishop, 2006), even when
no other constraints are applied, and one might wish to remove such outliers before
training any classification model.
Also, while we note that a decreasing covariance threshold corresponds to a decreas-
ing degree of disparate impact (Eq. 3.9), the relation between the two is only empirically
observed. A precise mapping between covariance and DI is quite challenging to derive
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analytically since it depends on the specific classifier and the dataset being used. Such a
theoretical analysis would be an interesting future direction.
Finally, as we discussed in Section 2.2.2, a disparity in positive class outcome rates of
different groups may not always result in a disparate impact liability. In other words,
disparate impact is not always a suitable measure of nondiscrimination. We discuss
examples, and ways to address such scenarios in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
Disparate mistreatment:
A new measure of discrimination
While disparate impact is an intuitive interpretation of discrimination—especially in
scenarios when the training data is suspected to be biased (Siegel, 2014)—in certain other
scenarios, its utility can be quite limited. For example, consider Ricci vs. DeStefano (Ricci,
2009), the US Supreme Court case mentioned in Section 2.2.2. The court in this case found
that since the promotion test was relevant to the job at hand, the apparent disparate
impact in the selection outcomes would not cause a discrimination liability. In other
words, the disparate impact in this instance would not be deemed as causing wrongful
relative disadvantage. This case seems to suggest that in situations when one can
ascertain the reliability of the decisions in the training data, disparate impact might
not be a suitable interpretation (and measure) of wrongful relative disadvantage, and
mitigating disparate impact in such cases can instead be interpreted as causing reverse
discrimination.
To account for such situations, we propose an alternative measure of discrimination
(or an interpretation of wrongful relative disadvantage), disparate mistreatment,13 espe-
cially well-suited for scenarios where ground truth is available for historical decisions
used during the training phase. We call a decision making process to be suffering from
disparate mistreatment with respect to a given sensitive feature (e.g., race) if the misclassi-
fication rates (in contrast to beneficial outcome rates under disparate impact) differ for
groups of people having different values of that sensitive feature (e.g., African-Americans
and whites). For example, in the case of the NYPD Stop-question-and-frisk program
(SQF) (Meares, 2014) where pedestrians are stopped on the suspicion of possessing an
illegal weapon (Goel et al., 2016), having different prediction accuracy (or equivalently,
different misclassification rates) for different races would constitute a case of disparate
13In a concurrent work, Hardt et al. (2016) proposed a measure of discrimination which is in essence
very close to disparate mistreatment. For details, see Section 4.2.
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mistreatment. In this way, disparate mistreatment interprets the disparity in misclassification
rates as imposition of wrongful relative disadvantage.
In addition to the overall misclassification rate in general, depending on the applica-
tion scenario and the consequences of each type of misclassifications , one might want to
measure disparate mistreatment with respect to different kinds of misclassification rates.
For example, in pretrial risk assessments, the decision making process might only be
required to ensure that the false positive rates are equal for all groups, since it may be
more acceptable to let a guilty person go, rather than incarcerate an innocent person.14
On the other hand, in loan approval systems, one might instead favor a decision making
process in which the false negative rates are equal, to ensure that deserving (positive
class) people with a certain sensitive feature value are not denied (negative class) loans
disproportionately. Similarly, depending on the application scenario at hand, and the
cost of the type of misclassification, one may choose to measure disparate mistreatment
using false discovery and false omission rates, instead of false positive and false negative
rates (detailed in Table 4.1).
To train classifiers that are free of disparate mistreatment, we extend our decision
boundary covariance mechanism and propose a tractable proxy that can be included in
the formulation of convex boundary-based classifiers as a convex-concave constraint. The
resulting formulation can be solved efficiently using recent advances in convex-concave
programming (Shen et al., 2016b).
Relevant publication
Results presented in this chapter are published in (Zafar et al., 2017a).
4.1 Differentiating disparate mistreatment from disparate
treatment and disparate impact
In this section, we use an illustrative example to differentiate our newly proposed
measure of disparate mistreatment from existing measures of disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
Disparate mistreatment. Intuitively, disparate mistreatment can arise in any automated
decision making system whose outputs (or decisions) are not perfectly (i.e., 100%) ac-
curate. For example, consider a decision making system that uses a logistic regression
classifier to provide binary outputs (say, positive and negative) on a set of people. If
14 “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”—William Blackstone
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User features Ground Truth Classifier’s Disp. Disp. Disp.
Sensitive Non-sensitive (Has Weapon) Decision to Stop Treat. Imp. Mist.
Gender Clothing Bulge Prox. Crime C1 C2 C3
Male 1 1 1 3 1 1 1
C1 7 3 3Male 2 1 0 3 1 1 0
Male 3 0 1 7 1 0 1
C2 3 7 3Female 1 1 1 3 1 0 1
Female 2 1 0 7 1 1 1
C3 3 7 7Female 3 0 0 3 0 1 0
Figure 4.1: Decisions of three fictitious classifiers (C1, C2 and C3) on whether (1) or not
(0) to stop a pedestrian on the suspicion of possessing an illegal weapon.
Gender is a sensitive feature, whereas the other two features (suspicious
bulge in clothing and proximity to a crime scene) are non-sensitive. Ground
truth on whether the person is actually in possession of an illegal weapon is
also shown.
the items in the training data with positive and negative class labels are not linearly
separable, as is often the case in many real-world application scenarios, the system will
misclassify (i.e., produce false positives, false negatives, or both, on) some people. In this
context, the misclassification rates may be different for groups of people having different
values of sensitive features (e.g., males and females; African-Americans and whites) and
thus disparate mistreatment may arise.
Figure 4.1 provides an example of decision making systems (classifiers) with and
without disparate mistreatment. In all cases, the classifiers need to decide whether to
stop a pedestrian—on the suspicion of possessing an illegal weapon—using a set of
features such as bulge in clothing and proximity to a crime scene. The “ground truth”
on whether a pedestrian actually possesses an illegal weapon is also shown. We show
decisions made by three different classifiers C1, C2 and C3. We deem C1 and C2 as
discriminatory due to disparate mistreatment because their rate of erroneous decisions
for males and females are different: C1 has different false negative rates for males and
females (0.0 and 0.5, respectively), whereas C2 has different false positive rates (0.0 and
1.0) as well as different false negative rates (0.0 and 0.5) for males and females.
Disparate treatment. As described in Section 2.2.1, disparate treatment arises when a
decision making system provides different outputs for groups of people with the same
(or similar) values of non-sensitive features but different values of sensitive features.
In Figure 4.1, we deem C2 and C3 to be discriminatory due to disparate treatment
since C2’s (C3’s) decisions for Male 1 and Female 1 (Male 2 and Female 2) are different
even though they have the same values of non-sensitive features.
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Disparate impact. Finally, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2, disparate impact arises when a
decision making system provides outputs that benefit (hurt) a group of people sharing a
value of sensitive feature more frequently than other groups of people.
In Figure 4.1, assuming that a pedestrian benefits from a decision of not being
stopped, we deem C1 as discriminatory due to disparate impact because the fraction of
males and females that were stopped are different (1.0 and 0.66, respectively).
4.1.1 Application scenarios for disparate impact vs. disparate mis-
treatment
Note that unlike in the case of disparate mistreatment, the notion of disparate impact
is independent of the “ground truth” information about the decisions, i.e., whether or
not the decisions are correct or valid. Thus, the notion of disparate impact is particularly
appealing in application scenarios where ground truth information for decisions does not
exist and the historical decisions used during training are not reliable and thus cannot
be trusted. Unreliability of historical decisions for automated decision making systems
is particularly concerning in scenarios like recruiting or loan approvals, where biased
judgments by humans in the past may be used when training classifiers for the future.
In such application scenarios, it is hard to distinguish correct and incorrect decisions,
making it hard to assess or use disparate mistreatment as a notion of discrimination.
However, in scenarios where ground truth information for decisions can be obtained,
disparate impact can be quite misleading as a notion of discrimination. That is, in scenar-
ios where the validity of decisions can be reliably ascertained, it would be possible to
distinguish disproportionality in beneficial (or, desirable class) decision outcomes for
sensitive feature groups that arises from justifiable reasons (e.g., qualification of the can-
didates) and disproportionality that arises for non-justifiable reasons (i.e., discrimination
against certain groups). By requiring beneficial decision outcomes to be proportional
(i.e., requiring Eq. (2.5) to hold), the no-disparate-impact criterion risks introducing
reverse-discrimination against qualified candidates. In contrast, when the correctness of
decisions can be determined, disparate mistreatment can not only be accurately assessed,
but its implementation as a discrimination measure (i.e., its removal from decision mak-
ing outcomes) can also avoid the above-mentioned reverse-discrimination, making it a
more appealing notion of discrimination.
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Table 4.1: In addition to the overall misclassification rate, error rates can be measured
in two different ways: false negative rate and false positive rate are defined
as fractions over the class distribution in the ground truth labels, or true labels.
On the other hand, false discovery rate and false omission rate are defined as
fractions over the class distribution in the predicted labels.
4.1.2 How does disparate mistreatment capture wrongful relative dis-
advantage?
Consider again the fictitious decision making task presented in Figure 4.1. In this task,
classifier C1—which has a false positive rate of 0 for men and 1.0 for women—can be
interpreted as imposing wrongful relative disadvantage on women since it can be thought
of as wrongly stereotyping women as carrying an illegal weapon even when in reality
they did not. Note that generating a false positive on persons from any group, men or
women, could be thought of as an imposition of wrongful disadvantage. However, only
when the false positive rates of the groups are different does the wrongful disadvantage
become relative.15
4.2 Measuring disparate mistreatment
Using the formal setup described in Section 2.3, we now formalize disparate mistreatment
in a classification task.
A binary classifier does not suffer from disparate mistreatment if the misclassification
rates for different groups of people having different values of the sensitive feature z
are the same. Table 4.1 describes various ways of measuring misclassification rates.
Specifically, misclassification rates can be measured as fractions over the class distribution
in the ground truth labels, i.e., as false positive and false negative rates, or over the class
15Recall from Section 2.1 and Altman (2016) that discrimination is in inherently a relative phenomenon.
We will discuss the cases of wrongful disadvantage, without regard to the group membership in Section 6.3.
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distribution in the predicted labels, i.e., as false omission and false discovery rates. Con-
sequently, the absence of disparate mistreatment in a binary classification task can be
specified with respect to the different misclassification measures as follows:
overall misclassification rate (OMR):
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0) = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1), (4.1)
false positive rate (FPR):
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, y = −1) = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, y = −1), (4.2)
false negative rate (FNR):
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, y = 1) = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, y = 1), (4.3)
false omission rate (FOR):
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, yˆ = −1) = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, yˆ = −1), (4.4)
false discovery rates (FDR):
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, yˆ = 1) = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, yˆ = 1). (4.5)
Finally, in a concurrent work, Hardt et al. (2016) proposed measures of discrimination
called “equal opportunity” and “equalized odds” which are in essence very similar to our
measure(s) of disparate mistreatment. Specifically, a classifier satisfies equal opportunity
if Eq. (4.3) holds, and it satisfies equalized odds if Eqs. (4.2-4.3) hold.
A brief detour into the impossibility of nondiscrimination.
In certain application scenarios, one might be interested in satisfying more than one type
of nondiscrimination defined in Eqs. (2.5-2.6, 4.1-4.5).
Some recent works (Chouldechova, 2016; Friedler et al., 2016; Kleinberg et al., 2017)
have investigated the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying multiple notions of
nondiscrimination. Chouldechova (2016) and Kleinberg et al. (2017) show that, when the
fraction of users with positive class labels differ between members of different sensitive
feature groups, it is impossible to construct classifiers that are equally well-calibrated
(where well-calibration essentially measures the false discovery and false omission
rates of a classifier) and also satisfy the equal false positive and false negative rate
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criterion (except for a “dumb” classifier that assign all examples to a single class). These
results suggest that satisfying all five criterion of disparate mistreatment (Table 4.1)
simultaneously is impossible when the underlying distribution of data is different for
different groups. Kleinberg et al. (2017) also show the impossibility of simultaneously
satisfying disparate impact and disparate mistreatment. However, in practice, it may
still be interesting to explore the best, even if imperfect, extent of nondiscrimination a
classifier can achieve.
4.3 Training classifiers free of disparate mistreatment
In this section, we devise a mechanism to train classifiers free of disparate mistreatment
when it is defined in terms of overall misclassification rate, false positive rate and false
negative rate, i.e., Eqs. (4.1-4.3).
To train such a classifier, one could incorporate the appropriate condition from
Eqs. (4.1-4.3) (based on which kind of misclassifications disparate mistreatment is being
defined for) into the classifier formulation. For example, in order to remove disparity
in overall misclassification rates (Eq. (4.1)), one could solve the following optimization
problem:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0)− P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1) ≤ ,
P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0)− P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1) ≥ −,
(4.6)
where  ∈ R+ controls the extent of disparate mistreatment.
However, since the conditions in Eqs. (4.1-4.3) are, in general, non-convex, solving
the constrained optimization problem defined by (4.6) seems difficult.
To overcome the above difficulty, we propose a tractable proxy, inspired by our
disparate impact proxy in Section 3.1. In particular, we propose to measure disparate
mistreatment using the covariance between the users’ sensitive features and the signed
distance between the feature vectors of misclassified users and the classifier decision
boundary, i.e.:
CovOMR(z, gθ(y,x)) = E[(z − z¯)(gθ(y,x)− g¯θ(y,x))] (4.7)
≈ 1
N
∑
(x,y,z)∈D
(z − z¯) gθ(y,x), (4.8)
where gθ(y,x) = min(0, ydθ(x)) and the term E[(z−z¯)]g¯θ(x) cancels out since E[(z−z¯)] =
0.
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As in the case of disparate impact, if a decision boundary satisfies Eq. (4.1), then the
(empirical) covariance defined above will be (approximately) zero (for a sufficiently large
training set) and we can train a classifier free of disparate mistreatment with respect to
overall misclassification rate by replacing the (intractable) constraint in Eq. (4.6) by an
alternative constraint as follows:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to 1
N
∑
(x,y,z)∈D (z − z¯) gθ(y,x) ≤ c,
1
N
∑
(x,y,z)∈D (z − z¯) gθ(y,x) ≥ −c,
(4.9)
where c ∈ R+ is a given threshold, which trades off accuracy and disparate mistreatment.
Similarly, we can define the above covariance measure for disparate mistreatment
with respect to false positive rates, false negative rates, false omission rates or false
discovery rates. For example, for false positive rates, one needs to consider the set of
misclassified users with (ground-truth) negative labels (D−), i.e.,
CovFPR(z, gθ(y,x)) ≈ 1
N−
∑
(x,y,z)∈D−
(z − z¯) gθ(y,x), (4.10)
where N− represents the size of D−.
However, in contrast with the covariance measure in the case of disparate impact,
defined by Eq. (3.2), the above covariance measures are not convex. Fortunately, the
covariance constraints for disparate mistreatment with respect to overall misclassification
rates, false positive rates and false negative rates can be easily converted into convex-
concave constraints, which can be solved efficiently by using recent advances in convex-
concave programming (Shen et al., 2016b), as follows.
Consider the constraints in Eq. (4.9), i.e.,∑
(x,y,z)∈D
(z − z¯) gθ(y,x) . c,
where ‘ . ′ denotes ‘≥’ and ‘≤’ and, without loss of generality, we left out the constant
term 1
N
. Then, we can split the sum in the above expression into two terms:∑
(x,y)∈D0
(0− z¯) gθ(y,x) +
∑
(x,y)∈D1
(1− z¯) gθ(y,x) . c, (4.11)
where D0 and D1 are the subsets of the training dataset D taking values z = 0 and z = 1,
respectively. Define N0 = |D0| and N1 = |D1|, then one can write z¯ = (0×N0)+(1×N1)N = N1N
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and rewrite Eq. (4.11) as:
−N1
N
∑
(x,y)∈D0
gθ(y,x) +
N0
N
∑
(x,y)∈D1
gθ(y,x) ∼ c,
which, given that gθ(y,x) is convex in θ, results into a convex-concave (or, difference of
convex) function.
Finally, we can rewrite the problem defined by (4.9) as:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to −N1
N
∑
(x,y)∈D0 gθ(y,x) +
N0
N
∑
(x,y)∈D1 gθ(y,x) ≤ c
−N1
N
∑
(x,y)∈D0 gθ(y,x) +
N0
N
∑
(x,y)∈D1 gθ(y,x) ≥ −c,
(4.12)
which is a Disciplined Convex-Concave Program (DCCP) for any convex loss L(θ), and
can be efficiently solved using well-known heuristics (Shen et al., 2016b).
Proceeding similarly, we can convert the covariance constraints for disparate mis-
treatment with respect to false positive rates and false negative rates to convex-concave
constraints. For example, Eq. (4.6) can be rewritten to reduce disparity in false positive
rates as:
minimize
θ
L(θ)
subject to −N
−
1
N−
∑
(x,y)∈D−0 gθ(y,x) +
N−0
N−
∑
(x,y)∈D−1 gθ(y,x) ≤ c
−N−1
N−
∑
(x,y)∈D−0 gθ(y,x) +
N−0
N−
∑
(x,y)∈D−1 gθ(y,x) ≥ −c,
(4.13)
where D−i is the subset of the training data with z = i and y = −1, and N−i = |D−i |.
Note that unlike in the publication corresponding to this chapter (Zafar et al., 2017a),
we define the false positive rate covariance (Eq. (4.10)) only over the ground truth
negative dataset instead of the whole dataset. In cases where N
−
0
N0
6= N−1
N1
(or in other
words, the base-rates are different for the two sensitive feature groups), the false positive
rate covariance as defined by Zafar et al. (2017a) would not fully remove disparate
mistreatment.
While the covariance constraints for disparate mistreatment with respect to false
omission and false discovery rates can be readily defined, the corresponding constraints
cannot be easily converted into convex-concave constraints. Handling such constraints
efficiently is left as an interesting avenue for future work.
Finally, just like the disparate impact-free formulation (Section 3.1.2), the above
formulation for removing disparate mistreatment provides the flexibility to remove
disparate treatment as well. That is, since our formulation does not require the sensi-
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tive feature information at decision time, by keeping the features x disjoint from the
sensitive feature z, one can remove disparate mistreatment and disparate treatment
simultaneously.
Next, we particularize the formulation given by (4.12) for a logistic regression classi-
fier (Bishop, 2006).
Logistic regression without disparate mistreatment. The disparate mistreatment con-
straints, when disparate mistreatment is defined in terms of false negative rates, can be
particularized for a logistic regression classifier as:
minimize
θ
−∑(x,y)∈D log p(y|x,θ) } LR formulation
subject to −N
+
1
N+
∑
(x,y)∈D+0 min(0, yθ
Tx)
+
N+0
N+
∑
(x,y)∈D+1 min(0, yθ
Tx) ≤ c,
−N+1
N+
∑
(x,y)∈D+0 min(0, yθ
Tx)
+
N+0
N+
∑
(x,y)∈D+1 min(0, yθ
Tx) ≥ −c,

Disparate
mistreatment
constraints (4.14)
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we conduct experiments on synthetic as well as real world datasets to
evaluate the effectiveness of our scheme in controlling disparate mistreatment. To this
end, we first generate several synthetic datasets that illustrate different variations of
disparate mistreatment and show that our method can effectively remove disparate
mistreatment in each of the variations, often at a small cost in accuracy. We then conduct
experiments on two real world datasets. In both the synthetic and real-world datasets,
we compare the performance of our scheme with different competing methods.
For this evaluation, we aim at removing disparate mistreatment when it is defined
in terms of false positive rates (Eq. (4.2)) and false negative rates (Eq. (4.3)). Specifically,
we measure the degree of disparate mistreatment as:
DMFPR = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, y = −1)− P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, y = −1), (4.15)
DMFNR = P (yˆ 6= y|z = 0, y = 1)− P (yˆ 6= y|z = 1, y = 1), (4.16)
where the closer the values ofDMFPR andDMFNR to 0, the lower the degree of disparate
mistreatment. Note that unlike in the case of disparate impact in Eq. (3.9), we do not
use the absolute difference while quantifying disparate mistreatment. As we later show
in this section, the (in)equality in the signs of DMFPR and DMFNR carries significant
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consequences when considering disparate mistreatment with respect to false positive
rate and false negative rate simultaneously. In such cases, the sign of the differences
should also be taken into account.
4.4.1 Synthetic datasets
In this section, we empirically study the trade-off between nondiscrimination and ac-
curacy in a classifier that suffers from disparate mistreatment. However, disparate
mistreatment can arise in multiple different ways, as detailed below. To study these
different situations, we first start with a simple scenario in which the classifier suffers
from disparate mistreatment in terms of only false positive rate or false negative rate.
Then, we focus on a more complex scenario in which the classifier is discriminatory in
terms of both.
Disparate mistreatment on only false positive rate or false negative rate
The first scenario considers a case where a classifier maximizing accuracy leads to
disparate mistreatment in terms of only the false positive rate (false negative rate), while
being nondiscriminatory with respect to false negative rate (false positive rate), i.e.,
DMFPR 6= 0 and DMFNR = 0 (or, alternatively, DMFPR = 0 and DMFNR 6= 0).
To simulate this scenario, we generate 10,000 binary class labels (y ∈ {−1, 1}) and
corresponding sensitive feature values (z ∈ {0, 1}), both uniformly at random, and
assign a two-dimensional user feature vector (x) to each of the points. To ensure different
distributions for negative classes of the two sensitive feature groups (so that the two
groups have different false positive rates), the user feature vectors are sampled from the
following distributions (we sample 2500 points from each distribution):
p(x|z = 0, y = 1) = N ([2, 2], [3, 1; 1, 3])
p(x|z = 1, y = 1) = N ([2, 2], [3, 1; 1, 3])
p(x|z = 0, y = −1) = N ([1, 1], [3, 3; 1, 3])
p(x|z = 1, y = −1) = N ([−2,−2], [3, 1; 1, 3]).
Next, we train a logistic regression classifier optimizing for accuracy on this data. The
classifier is able to achieve an accuracy of 0.85. However, due to the differences in feature
distributions for the two sensitive feature groups, it achieves DMFNR = 0.15− 0.15 = 0
andDMFPR = 0.25−0.04 = 0.21, which constitutes a clear case of disparate mistreatment
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Acc=0.85; FPR=0.25:0.04; FNR=0.15:0.15
Acc=0.82; FPR=0.15:0.10; FNR=0.24:0.25
Figure 4.2: [Synthetic data with disparity only in false positive rates] The figure shows
the original decision boundary (solid line) and nondiscriminatory decision
boundary (dashed line), along with corresponding accuracy and false positive
rates for groups z = 0 (crosses) and z = 1 (circles). Disparate mistreatment
constraints cause the original decision boundary to rotate such that previously
misclassified subjects with z = 0 are moved into the negative class (decreasing
false positives), while well-classified subjects with z = 1 are moved into the
positive class (increasing false positives), leading to similar false positive rates
for both groups. The false negative rates disparity in this specific example
stay unaffected.
in terms of false positive rate. We then train a logistic regression classifier subject to
nondiscrimination constraints on false positive rate, with a covariance threshold c = 0.
Figure 4.2 shows the decision boundaries for both the unconstrained classifier (solid)
and the classifier with constraints on disparate mistreatment (dashed). We observe that
applying the disparate mistreatment constraint successfully causes the false positive
rates for both groups (z = 0 and z = 1) to become similar, and hence, the outcomes of
the classifier become more nondiscriminatory, i.e., DMFPR → 0, while DMFNR remains
close to zero. We note that the invariance of DMFNR may however change depending
on the underlying distribution of the data.
Disparate mistreatment on both false positive rate and false negative rate
In this part, we consider a more complex scenario, where the outcomes of the classifier
suffer from disparate mistreatment with respect to both false positive rate and false
negative rate, i.e., both DMFPR and DMFNR are non-zero. This scenario can in turn be
split into two cases:
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I. DMFPR and DMFNR have opposite signs, i.e., the decision boundary disproportionately
favors subjects from a certain sensitive feature group to be in the positive class (even
when such assignments are misclassifications) while disproportionately assigning the
subjects from the other group to the negative class. As a result, false positive rate for one
group is higher than the other, while the false negative rate for the same group is lower.
II.DMFPR andDMFNR have the same sign, i.e., both false positive as well as false negative
rate are higher for a certain sensitive feature group. These cases might arise in scenarios
when a certain group is harder to classify than the other.
Next, we experiment with each of the above cases separately.
— Case I: To simulate this scenario, we first generate 2,500 samples from each of the
following distributions:
p(x|z = 0, y = 1) = N ([2, 0], [5, 1; 1, 5])
p(x|z = 1, y = 1) = N ([2, 3], [5, 1; 1, 5])
p(x|z = 0, y = −1) = N ([−1,−3], [5, 1; 1, 5])
p(x|z = 1, y = −1) = N ([−1, 0], [5, 1; 1, 5])
An accuracy-maximizing logistic regression classifier on this dataset attains an overall
accuracy of 0.79 but leads to a false positive rate of 0.12 and 0.30 (i.e., DMFPR = 0.12−
0.30 = −0.18) for the sensitive feature groups z = 0 and z = 1, respectively; and false
negative rates of 0.30 and 0.12 (i.e., DMFNR = 0.30 − 0.12 = 0.18). To remove this
disparate mistreatment, we train three different classifiers, with disparate mistreatment
constraints on (i) false positive rates (ii) false negative rates and (iii) on both false positive
and false negative rates.
Figure 4.3 summarizes the results for this scenario by showing the decision bound-
aries for the unconstrained classifier (solid) and the constrained nondiscriminatory
classifiers. Here, we can observe several interesting patterns. First, removing disparate
mistreatment on only false positive rate causes a rotation in the decision boundary
to move previously misclassified subjects with z = 1 into the negative class, decreasing
their false positive rate. However, in the process, it also moves previously well-classified
subjects with z = 1 into the negative class, increasing their false negative rate. As a con-
sequence, controlling disparate mistreatment on false positive rate (Figure 4.3(a)), also
removes disparate mistreatment on false negative rate. A similar effect occurs when we
control disparate mistreatment only with respect to the false negative rate (Figure 4.3(b)),
and therefore, provides similar results as the constrained classifier for both false positive
and false negative rates (Figure 4.3(c)). This effect is explained by the distribution of the
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Acc=0.79; FPR=0.12:0.30; FNR=0.30:0.12
Acc=0.76; FPR=0.23:0.21; FNR=0.26:0.27
(a) FPR constraints
Acc=0.79; FPR=0.12:0.30; FNR=0.30:0.12
Acc=0.76; FPR=0.25:0.23; FNR=0.23:0.24
(b) FNR constraints
Acc=0.79; FPR=0.12:0.30; FNR=0.30:0.12
Acc=0.76; FPR=0.25:0.23; FNR=0.23:0.24
(c) Both constraints
Figure 4.3: [Synthetic data with disparity in false positive as well as false negative rates: DMFPR and DMFNR have opposite
signs. Removing disparate mistreatment on FPR can potentially help remove disparate mistreatment on FNR.
Removing disparate mistreatment on both at the same time leads to very similar results.
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Acc=0.81; FPR=0.30:0.07; FNR=0.26:0.13
Acc=0.76; FPR=0.22:0.26; FNR=0.33:0.13
(a) FPR constraints
Acc=0.81; FPR=0.30:0.07; FNR=0.26:0.13
Acc=0.74; FPR=0.69:0.05; FNR=0.13:0.12
(b) FNR constraints
Acc=0.81; FPR=0.30:0.07; FNR=0.26:0.13
Acc=0.58; FPR=0.80:0.85; FNR=0.02:0.01
(c) Both constraints
Figure 4.4: [Synthetic data with disparity in false positive as well as false negative rates: DMFPR and DMFNR have the same
sign. Removing disparate mistreatment on FPR can potentially increase disparate mistreatment on FNR. Removing
disparate mistreatment on both at the same time causes a larger drop in accuracy.
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data, where the centroids of the clusters for the group with z = 0 are shifted with respect
to the ones for the group z = 1.
— Case II: To simulate the scenario where both DMFPR and DMFNR have the same sign,
we generate 2,500 samples from each of the following distributions:
p(x|z = 0, y = 1) = N ([1, 2], [5, 2; 2, 5])
p(x|z = 1, y = 1) = N ([2, 3], [10, 1; 1, 4])
p(x|z = 0, y = −1) = N ([0,−1], [7, 1; 1, 7])
p(x|z = 1, y = −1) = N ([−5, 0], [5, 1; 1, 5])
We then train an accuracy-optimizing logistic regression classifier on this dataset. It
attains an accuracy of 0.81 but leads to DMFPR = 0.30 − 0.07 = 0.23 and DMFNR =
0.26− 0.13 = 0.13, resulting in disparate mistreatment in terms of both false positive and
negative rates. Then, similarly to the previous scenario, we train three different kind
of constrained classifiers to remove disparate mistreatment on (i) false positive rate, (ii)
false negatives rate, and (iii) both.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the results by showing the decision boundaries for both the
unconstrained classifiers (solid) and the constrained classifier (dashed) when controlling
for disparate mistreatment with respect to false positive rate, false negative rate and
both, respectively. We observe following noticeable patterns. First, controlling disparate
mistreatment for only false positive rate (false negative rate), leads to a relatively minor
drop in accuracy, but in contrast to Case I, can exacerbate the disparate mistreatment
on false negative rate (false positive rate). For example, while the decision boundary is
moved to control for disparate mistreatment on false negative rate, that is, to ensure that
more subjects with z = 0 are well-classified in the positive class (reducing false negative
rate), it also moves previously well-classified negative subjects into the positive class,
hence increasing the false positive rate. A similar phenomenon occur when controlling
disparate mistreatment with respect to only false positive rate. As a consequence,
controlling for both types of disparate mistreatment simultaneously brings DMFPR and
DMFNR close to zero, but causes a large drop in accuracy.
4.4.2 Real-world datasets
In this section, we experiment with two real-world datasets to test the effectiveness of
our scheme in controlling disparate mistreatment. We also conduct comparisons with
two different competing methods.
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Datasets and experimental setup. We experiment with two real-world datasets: the
ProPublica COMPAS risk assessment dataset (Larson et al., 2016a) and the NYPD stop-
question-and-frisk (SQF) dataset (Stop, Question and Frisk Data, 2017).
The ProPublica COMPAS dataset consists of data about 7, 215 pretrial criminal de-
fendants, and contains a number of features such as the age of the criminal defendant,
number of prior criminal offenses etc., and a class label indicating whether the person
recidivated within two years or their arrest (positive class) or not (negative class). For
more information about the data collection, we point the reader to a detailed descrip-
tion (Larson et al., 2016b) and some of the follow-up discussion on this dataset (Angwin
and Larson, 2016; Flores et al., 2016). We designate race as the sensitive feature. Follow-
ing ProPublica’s analysis (Larson et al., 2016b), we only consider a subset of offenders
whose race (the sensitive feature) is either African-American or white. Recidivism rates
for the two groups are shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A. For modeling the classification
task, we use the same set of features as used by ProPublica (Larson et al., 2016b).16 After
performing the filtering described above, we obtain 5, 287 subjects and 5 features.
The NYPD SQF dataset consists of 84, 868 pedestrians who were stopped in the year
2012 on the suspicion of having a weapon. The dataset also contains over 100 features
(e.g., gender, height, reason for stop) and a binary label which indicates whether (negative
class) or not (positive class) a weapon was discovered. For our analysis, we consider the
race to be the sensitive feature with values African-American and white. The classes in
this dataset are highly imbalanced (97% of subjects in positive class), and as a result, a
logistic regression classifier classifies almost all data points into the positive class. To
counter this imbalance, we subsample the dataset to have equal number of subjects
from each class. Information about weapon discovery rate for both races in included in
Tables A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A. Furthermore, for training the classifiers, we consider
the same set of features as Goel et al. (2016), with the exception that we exclude the
highly sparse features ‘precinct’ and ‘timestamp of the stop’. After performing these two
filtering steps, we obtain 5, 832 subjects and 19 features.
Methods. In our experiments, we compare our approach to two baseline methods. More
specifically, we consider the following methods:
16Notice that goal of this section is not to analyze the best set of features for recidivism prediction, rather,
we focus on showing that our method can effectively remove disparate mistreatment in a given dataset.
Hence, we chose to use the same set of features as used by ProPublica for their analysis. Moreover, since
race is also included in this feature set, we additionally assume that all the methods have access to the
sensitive features while making decisions. However, we will discuss the results of our method when
operating without access to race as well.
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• Our method: Implements our scheme to avoid disparate treatment and disparate
mistreatment simultaneously. Disparate mistreatment is avoided by using covari-
ance constraints on false positive and / or false negative rates. Disparate treatment
is avoided by ensuring that sensitive feature information is not used while making
decisions, i.e., by keeping user feature vectors (x) and the sensitive features (z)
disjoint.
• Our methodsen: Implements our scheme to avoid disparate mistreatment only. The
user feature vectors (x) and the sensitive features (z) are not disjoint, that is, the
classifier learns a non-zero weight for z. Therefore, the sensitive feature information
is used for decision making, resulting in disparate treatment.
• Hardt et al. (Hardt et al., 2016): Operates by post-processing the outcomes of
a possibly discriminatory classifier (logistic regression in this case) and using
different decision thresholds for different sensitive feature value groups to remove
disparate mistreatment. By construction, it needs the sensitive feature information
while making decisions, and hence cannot avoid disparate treatment. This method
is similar to the post-processing scheme discussed in (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017b).
• Baseline: Baseline introduced by us to felicitate a second comparison method. Tries
to remove disparate mistreatment by introducing different penalties for misclas-
sified data points with different sensitive feature values during training phase.
Specifically, it proceeds in two steps. First, it trains a possibly discriminatory clas-
sifier minimizing a loss function (e.g., logistic loss) over the training data. Next,
it selects the set of misclassified data points from the sensitive feature group that
presents the higher error rate. For example, if one wants to remove disparate
mistreatment with respect to false positive rate and DMFPR > 0 (which means the
false positive rate for points with z = 0 is higher than that of z = 1), it selects the
set of misclassified data points in the training set having z = 0 and y = −1. Next,
it iteratively re-trains the classifier with increasingly higher penalties on this set
of data points until a certain level of nondiscrimination is achieved in the training
set (until DMFPR ≤ ). The algorithm is summarized in Figure 1, particularized to
remove disparate mistreatment defined in terms of false positive rate. This process
can be intuitively extended to account for disparate mistreatment in terms of false
negative rate or for both false positive rate and false negative rate. This method
can be trained with or without using sensitive feature information while making
decisions. We opt for the latter option.
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Algorithm 1: Baseline method for removing disparate mistreatment with respect to
FPR.
Input: Training set D = {(xi, yi, zi)}Ni=1, ∆ > 0  > 0
Output: Non-discriminatory baseline decision boundary θ
Initialize: Penalty C = 1
1 Train (potentially discriminatory) classifier θ = argminθ
∑
d∈D L(θ,d)
2 Compute yˆi = sign(dθ(xi)) and DMFPR on D.
3 if DMFPR > 0 then s = 0
4 else s = 1
5 P = {xi, yi, zi|yˆ 6= yi, zi = s}, P¯ = D \ P .
6 while DMFPR >  do
7 Increase penalty: C = C + ∆.
8 θ = argminθ C
∑
d∈P L(θ,d) +
∑
d∈P¯ L(θ,d)
9 end
Results. First, we experiment with a standard logistic regression classifier optimizing
for accuracy on both datasets. For the COMPAS dataset, the (unconstrained) logistic
regression classifier leads to an accuracy of 0.664. However, the classifier yields false
positive rates of 0.35 and 0.17, respectively, for African-Americans and whites (i.e.,
DMFPR = 0.18), and false negative rates of 0.32 and 0.61 (i.e., DMFNR = −0.29). These
results constitute a clear case of disparate mistreatment in terms of both false positive
rate and false negative rate. The classifier puts one group (African-Americans) at relative
disadvantage by disproportionately misclassifying negative (did not recidivate) subjects
from this group into the positive (did recidivate) class. This disproportional assignment
results in a significantly higher false positive rate for African-Americans as compared
to whites. On the other hand, the classifier puts the other group (whites) on a relative
advantage by disproportionately misclassifying positive (did recidivate) subjects from
this group into the negative (did not recidivate) class (resulting in a higher false negative
rate). Note that this scenario resembles our synthetic example Case I in Section 4.4.1.
For the SQF data, the (unconstrained) logistic regression classifier leads to an accuracy
of 0.751. However, the classifier yields false positive rates of 0.38 and 0.11, respectively,
for African-Americans and whites (i.e., DMFPR = 0.27), and false negative rates of 0.19
and 0.31 (i.e., DMFNR = −0.12). Notice that unlike the COMPAS dataset, being classified
positive here is an advantageous outcome—positive class in this case is not being stopped
whereas the positive class in the COPMAS dataset is being classified as being a recidivist.
This scenario also resembles our synthetic example Case I in Section 4.4.1.
Next, we apply our framework on a logistic regression classifier to eliminate dis-
parate mistreatment with respect to false positive rate, false negative rate, and on both,
and compare its performance with the two alternative methods. While controlling for
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FPR constraints FNR constraints Both constraints
Acc DFPR DFNR Acc DFPR DFNR Acc DFPR DFNR
ProPuclica
COMPAS
Our methodsen 0.653 0.03 −0.10 0.656 −0.05 −0.01 0.654 −0.02 −0.03
Baseline 0.631 0.01 −0.18 0.656 −0.03 −0.03 0.615 −0.19 0.13
Hardt et al. 0.661 0.01 −0.08 0.654 −0.06 0.01 0.632 0.02 0.01
NYPD
SQF
Our method 0.633 0.06 −0.01 0.705 0.22 −0.07 0.642 0.05 0.04
Our methodsen 0.727 0.08 0.07 0.743 0.18 0.00 0.726 0.07 0.07
Baseline 0.527 0.02 −0.08 0.734 0.14 0.01 0.435 −0.71 0.95
Hardt et al. 0.725 0.03 0.12 0.734 0.14 0.04 0.722 0.02 0.06
Table 4.2: Performance of different methods while removing disparate mistreatment
with respect to false positive rate, false negative rate and both. When provided
with the same amount of information, our technique as well as the post-
processing technique of Hardt et al. lead to similar accuracy for the same level
of disparate mistreatment. The baseline tends to present the worst results.
disparate mistreatment with respect to FPR and FNR simultaneously, the method of
Hardt et al. can be interpreted as finding the optimal point that minimizes the loss on the
average of the two group-conditional ROC curves (one curve for each sensitive feature
group), or the one that minimizes the loss on the point-wise minimum of the two curves.
The optimal point in both cases lies on the point-wise minimum of the two curves. Both
variants lead to similar performance, hence we report the results for the former.
Table 4.2 shows the results by showing the trade-off between disparate mistreatment
and accuracy achieved by our method, the method by Hardt et al., and the baseline.
Similarly to the results in Section 4.4.1, we observe that for all three methods, controlling
for disparate mistreatment on false positive rate (false negative rate) also helps decrease
disparate mistreatment on false negative rate (false positive rate), at least to some limited
extent. Moreover, both our method and the method by Hardt et al. achieve similar
accuracy for a given level of disparate mistreatment when provided with the same
amount of information (sensitive feature information). We also note that the baseline
tends to be somewhat unstable and fails to converge to a nondiscriminatory solution in
some cases (e.g., both FPR and FNR constraints on COMPAS and SQF datasets).
Finally, as noted in the beginning of this section, one of the five features considered
for the ProPublica COMPAS dataset was race. As as a result, all the methods on this
dataset lead to disparate treatment with respect to race since the final outcome of the
classifiers directly depends on race. To avoid this disparate treatment, we also train our
method on the remaining four features (number of prior offenses, age of the defendant,
arrest charge and the degree of the charge) while excluding race.
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In this case, while removing disparate mistreatment on false positive rate, our
method achieves an accuracy of 0.603 and a DMFPR of 0.06. While removing disparate
mistreatment on false negative rate, our method achieves an accuracy of 0.616 and
DMFNR of −0.15. Applying constraints on both false positive and false negative rate
does not lead to significant removal of disparate mistreatment as compared to the
unconstrained classifier—the accuracy is 0.662 while DMFPR and DMFNR are 0.16 and
−0.28, respectively.
These results show that for the COMPAS dataset, predictably (as in the case of SQF
dataset), our method without access to the sensitive feature at the decision time sacrifices
a greater amount of accuracy while removing disparate mistreatment as compared to
the case when it has access to the sensitive feature (i.e., Our methodsens in Table 4.2 ).
Additionally, in the case of constraints on both false positive as well as false negative rates,
our method without access to sensitive feature does not effectively remove disparate
mistreatment. This observation would seem to suggest that using race as a feature would
lead to a more effective removal of disparate mistreatment. However, we point out that
we do not notice the same issue for the SQF dataset, or the synthetic datasets considered
in Section 4.4.1. The problem here may also have been caused by the very small feature
set available (only four features), and gathering a larger feature set might help alleviate
this issue.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we proposed a new measure of nondiscrimination, disparate mistreat-
ment, that might be a more suitable measure of discrimination as compared to disparate
impact in situations when one is learning from datasets with (unbiased) ground truth la-
bels. We also propose mechanisms to remove disparate mistreatment from classification
tasks, and compare the performance of our method with two competing techniques.
Experimental results show that when provided with the same amount of information,
our method provides a similar accuracy as compared to competing methods for the
same level of disparate mistreatment. Additionally, our method provides the possibility
to remove both disparate mistreatment as well as disparate treatment simultaneously.
However, this removing both kinds of discrimination would naturally lead to a lesser
accuracy as compared to the cases when one is concerned with removing just one kind
of discrimination.
We also note that our method for removing disparate mistreatment suffers from the
similar limitations as the disparate impact-free classification method proposed in Chap-
ter 3. Additionally, our formulation of training classifiers free of disparate mistreatment
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is not a convex program, but a disciplined convex-concave program (DCCP), which can
be efficiently solved using heuristic-based methods (Shen et al., 2016b). While these
methods are shown to work well in practice, unlike convex optimization, they do not
provide any guarantees on the global optimality of the solution. In such cases, as is often
suggested, one can solve the optimization problem with multiple random initialization
points, and pick the solution with the best performance (Shen et al., 2016a).
Moreover, we note that in the case of controlling disparate mistreatment with respect
to false positive or false negative rates, the corresponding covariance is computed
only over the ground truth negative and ground truth positive datasets, respectively
(Section 4.3). Since our method operates by estimating these covariances on the given
training dataset, in cases when the training dataset consists of a very small negative or
very small positive class, the corresponding covariance estimates might be inaccurate and
as a result, our method might not be able to remove disparate mistreatment effectively.
However, class imbalance problems are not specific to our method only, and are a
well-known issue in general classification tasks as well (Bishop, 2006; Japkowicz, 2000).
CHAPTER 5
Discrimination beyond disparity:
Preference-based measures of
discrimination
Notice that the nondiscrimination measures examined until now quantify wrongful
relative disadvantage through the absence of equality or parity (e.g., parity of treatment
in the case of disparate treatment, and parity of impact in the case of disparate impact).
While the absence of parity is an intuitive way to capture wrongful relative disadvantage,
we notice that some interpretations of the discrimination definition (Section 2.1) may
argue otherwise. We describe two such interpretations below.
These new interpretations, which we refer to as preferred treatment and preferred
impact are respectively motivated by the game theoretic notions of envy-freeness (Varian,
1974) and bargaining consensus (Nash Jr, 1950). At the core of these interpretations is
the idea of group preferences: Given the choice between various sets of decision outcomes,
any group of users would collectively prefer the set that contains the largest fraction (or the
greatest number) of beneficial decision outcomes for that group.17 Our new preference-
based measures of nondiscrimination use the concept of user groups’ preference as
follows:
— Preferred treatment. A decision making system offers preferred treatment if every
sensitive feature group (e.g., men and women) prefers the set of decisions they receive
over the set of decisions they would have received had they collectively presented them-
selves to the system as members of a different sensitive group. The preferred treatment
interpretation is inspired by the game theoretic notion of envy-freeness. Under an envy-
free system, all the parties involved in decision making prefer their own outcomes over
the outcomes of the others—even when such outcomes are disparate. Here, preferred
17Although it is quite possible that certain individuals from the group may not prefer the set that
maximizes the benefit for the group as a whole. See Section 5.1 for details.
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Figure 5.1: A fictitious decision making scenario involving two groups: men (M) and
women (W). Feature f1 (x-axis) is highly predictive for women whereas
f2 (y-axis) is highly predictive for men. Green (red) quadrants denote the
positive (negative) class. Within each quadrant, the points are distributed
uniformly and the numbers in parenthesis denote the number of subjects in
that quadrant. The left panel shows the optimal classifier satisfying parity in
treatment. This classifier leads to all the men getting classified as negative.
The middle panel shows the optimal classifier satisfying parity in impact
(in addition to parity in treatment). This classifier achieves impact parity
by misclassifying women from positive class into negative class, and in the
process, incurs a significant cost in terms of accuracy. The right panel shows
a classifier consisting of group-conditional classifiers for men (purple) and
women (blue). Both the classifiers satisfy the preferred treatment criterion
since for each group, adopting the other group’s classifier would lead to a
smaller fraction of beneficial outcomes (refer to Section 5.1 for a discussion on
group- vs. individual-level preferences). Additionally, this group-conditional
classifier is also a preferred impact classifier since both groups get more
benefit as compared to the impact parity classifier. The overall accuracy is
better than the parity classifiers.
treatment interprets the presence of envy (where one group prefers another group’s
outcomes over their own) as imposition of wrongful relative disadvantage.
Notice that the preferred treatment interpretation represents a relaxation of treatment
parity (or avoiding disparate treatment). That is, every decision making system that
achieves treatment parity also satisfies preferred treatment, which implies (in theory)
that the optimal decision accuracy that can be achieved under the preferred treatment
condition is at least as high as the one achieved under treatment parity. Additionally,
preferred treatment allows group-conditional decision making (not allowed by treatment
parity), which might be necessary to achieve high decision accuracy in scenarios when
the predictive power of features varies greatly between different sensitive feature groups,
as shown in Figure 5.1.
Chapter 5. Discrimination beyond disparity 64
In this way, while preferred treatment is a looser interpretation of nondiscrimination
than treatment parity, it retains a core nondiscrimination property embodied in treatment
parity, namely, envy-freeness at the level of user groups. Under preferred treatment, no
group of users (e.g., men or women, African-Americans or whites) would feel that they
would be collectively better off by switching their group membership (e.g., gender, race).
Thus, preferred treatment decision making, despite allowing disparate treatment, is not
vulnerable to being characterized as “reverse discrimination” against, or “affirmative
action” for certain groups.
— Preferred impact. A decision making system offers preferred impact if every sensitive
feature group (e.g., men and women) prefers the set of decisions they receive over the
set of decisions they would have received under the criterion of impact parity (or
avoiding disparate impact). The preferred impact interpretation is inspired by the
bargaining problem in game theory where given some limited resources and a base
resource allocation, two parties try to agree on a solution that maximizes their respective
benefits beyond the base allocation (under the resource constraints).18 For reaching a
preferred impact solution, we take the solution satisfying impact parity to be the base
allocation. Here, preferred impact interprets one or more groups not preferring their
outcomes to the impact parity solution as imposition of wrongful relative disadvantage
on those groups.
Note that the preferred impact criterion represents a relaxation of impact parity. That
is, every decision making system that achieves impact parity also satisfies preferred
impact, which implies (in theory) that the optimal decision accuracy that can be achieved
under the preferred impact condition is at least as high as the one achieved under impact
parity. Additionally, preferred impact allows disparity in benefits received by different
groups, which may be justified in scenarios where insisting on impact parity would
only lead to a reduction in the beneficial outcomes received by one or more groups,
without necessarily improving them for any other group (essentially resulting in non
Pareto-optimal solutions). In such scenarios, insisting on impact parity can additionally
lead to a reduction in the decision accuracy, creating a case of tragedy of impact parity
with a worse decision making all round, as shown in Figure 5.1.
In this way, while preferred impact is a looser interpretation of nondiscrimination
compared to impact parity, by guaranteeing that every group receives at least as many
beneficial outcomes as they would have received under impact parity, it retains the core
nondiscrimination gains in beneficial outcomes that the historically discriminated groups
would have achieved under the nondiscrimination criterion of impact parity.
18If no agreement can be reached, then the parties resort to the base allocation .
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In the rest of this chapter, we formally describe the preference-based notions of
nondiscrimination. To enable decision making that satisfies the preferred treatment and
preferred impact interpretations, we extend our decision boundary covariance mecha-
nism and propose tractable proxies that can be encoded into the classifier formulations
as convex-concave constraints. We show empirically on various synthetic and real-world
datasets that preference-based measure of nondiscrimination can lead to significant gains
in accuracy over parity-based measures, hence reducing the cost of nondiscrimination.
Relevant publication
Results presented in this chapter are published in (Zafar et al., 2017c).
5.1 Measures for preference-based nondiscrimination
We now formalize our preference-based measures of nondiscrimination. To that end, we
first formalize the notion of group benefits, then revisit the parity-based measures of
disparate treatment and disparate impact, and finally formalize the two preference-based
measures.
Group benefit (Bz) is the fraction of beneficial outcomes received by users sharing a
certain value of the sensitive feature z (e.g., females, males). For example, in a loan
approval scenario, the beneficial outcome for a user may be receiving the loan and the
group benefit for each value of z can be defined as:
Bz(θ) = P (yˆ = 1|θ, z) (5.1)
Given this definition of groups benefits, one can re-write the absence of disparate
impact—also formulated in Eq. (2.5)—in a classifier θ as follows:
Bz(θ) = Bz′(θ) ∀ z, z′ ∈ Z, (5.2)
i.e., the probability of the classifier assigning a beneficial outcome to all sensitive feature
groups is the same.
In case one aims to train group-conditional classifiers (one classifier for each group),
i.e., θ = {θz}z∈Z , one can re-write the above parity impact condition as follows:
Bz(θz) = Bz′(θz′) ∀ z, z′ ∈ Z. (5.3)
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Satisfying disparate treatment, on the other hand, merely requires that the sensitive
feature information is not used in decision making, i.e.: no group-conditional classifiers
are used (θz = θz′ ∀ z, z′ ∈ Z) and that the classifier parameters do not include the
sensitive feature z (z and x are disjoint sets).
Given the above metrics, we can formalize the preference-based nondiscrimination
measures as follows:
Preferred treatment. If a classifier θ resorts to group-conditional classifiers, i.e., θ =
{θz}z∈Z , it is a preferred treatment classifier if each group sharing a sensitive feature
value z benefits more from its corresponding group-conditional classifier θz than it would
benefit if it would be classified by any of the other group-conditional classifiers θz′ , i.e.,
Bz(θz) ≥ Bz(θz′) ∀ z, z′ ∈ Z. (5.4)
Note that, if a classifier θ does not resort to group-conditional classifiers, i.e., θz = θ for
all z ∈ Z , it will be always be a preferred treatment classifier. That is, a classifier satisfying
treatment parity criterion will also be a preferred treatment classifier. This shows that the set of
treatment parity classifiers is a subset of preferred treatment classifiers. In other words, a
preferred treatment classifier (in theory) can always have an accuracy which is at least as
good as that of a treatment parity classifier.
Preferred impact. A classifier θ offers preferred impact over a classifier θ′ ensuring
impact parity if it achieves higher group benefit for each sensitive feature value group,
i.e.,
Bz(θ) ≥ Bz(θ′) ∀ z ∈ Z. (5.5)
One can also rewrite the above condition for group-conditional classifiers, i.e., θ =
{θz}z∈Z and θ′ = {θ′z}z∈Z , as follows:
Bz(θz) ≥ Bz(θ′z) ∀ z ∈ Z. (5.6)
Again, note that a classifier that satisfies the impact parity condition will also be a preferred
impact classifier. Following this reasoning, it is easy to show that the set of impact parity
classifiers is a subset of preferred impact classifiers, and consequently, a preferred impact
classifier (in theory), can always achieve at least as high an accuracy as the impact parity
classifier.
Connection to the fair division literature. Our notion of preferred treatment is inspired
by the concept of envy-freeness (Berliant and Thomson, 1992; Varian, 1974) in the fair
division literature. Intuitively, an envy-free resource division ensures that no user would
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prefer the resources allocated to another user over their own allocation. Similarly, our notion
of preferred treatment ensures envy-free decision making at the level of sensitive feature
groups. Specifically, with preferred treatment classification, no sensitive feature group
would prefer the outcomes from the classifier of another group.
Our notion of preferred impact draws inspiration from the two-person bargaining
problem (Nash Jr, 1950) in the fair division literature. In a bargaining scenario, given a
base resource allocation (also called the disagreement point), two parties try to divide
some additional resources between themselves. If the parties cannot agree on a division,
no party gets the additional resources, and both would only get the allocation specified
by the disagreement point. Taking the resources to be the beneficial outcomes, and
the disagreement point to be the allocation specified by the impact parity classifier, a
preferred impact classifier offers enhanced benefits to all the sensitive feature groups.
Put differently, the group benefits provided by the preferred impact classifier Pareto-
dominate the benefits provided by the impact parity classifier.
On individual-level preferences. Notice that preferred treatment and preferred impact
notions are defined based on the group preferences, i.e., whether a group as a whole
prefers (or, gets more benefits from) a given set of outcomes over another set. However,
it is quite possible that a set of outcomes preferred by the group collectively is not
preferred by certain individuals in the group. An example of such a setup is provided in
Figure 5.2, where even though the classifier is a preferred treatment classifier for men at
a group-level, it is not a preferred treatment classifier for men at an individual-level.19
Consequently, one can extend our proposed notions to account for individual preferences
as well, i.e., a set of outcomes is preferred over another if all the individuals in the group
prefer it. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on preferred treatment and preferred
impact in the context of group preferences, and leave the case of individual preferences
and its implications on the cost of achieving nondiscrimination for future work.
5.1.1 How do preference-based measures capture wrongful relative
disadvantage?
As described earlier in this chapter, preferred treatment and preferred impact are inspired
by game theoretic notions of envy-freeness and bargaining consensus.
In this context, a decision making process that does not ensure preferred treatment—
i.e., where one or more groups are envious of another group’s outcomes—can be inter-
19On the other hand, the classifier in Figure 5.1 is not only a preferred treatment classifier (for both men
and women) at a group-level, but it is also one at the level of the individuals—since no individual from
either group would prefer the other group’s classifier.
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Figure 5.2: [Individual vs. group-level preferences] A fictitious dataset with optimal
(group-conditional) classifiers. This dataset is a slight variant of the one in
Figure 5.1, with the difference being that the (positive and negative) classes
are not perfectly separable in this case (even with group-conditional classi-
fiers). On this dataset, 30% of the men receive beneficial outcomes with their
own classifier whereas 10% receive beneficial outcomes with the classifier
of women. So the preferred treatment criterion (for group-level preferences)
is satisfied, as men would prefer their own classifier as a group. However,
some of the men who did not receive beneficial outcomes under their own
classifier, receive beneficial outcomes when using the classifier of women, i.e.,
the men inside the bottom left (red) quadrant who are on the right side of
the classifier for women (blue line). So these men would individually prefer
women’s classifier, even though the men’s group as a whole prefers their own
classifier. Hence, while this setup provides preferred treatment for men at a
group-level, it does not provide preferred treatment at an individual-level.
(For women, the setup provides preferred treatment both at a group as well
as at an individual-level.)
preted as causing wrongful relative disadvantage on the groups that get the envious
outcomes, as these groups feel that they would get better outcomes had they been the
part of another group (with all other features being the same).
On the other hand, a decision making process that does not ensure preferred impact—
i.e., one or more groups get lower benefits than the impact parity solution (or the base
allocation)—can be interpreted as causing wrongful relative disadvantage since it denies
the groups in questions of the nondiscrimination gains that they would have received
under an impact parity situation by decreasing their beneficial outcomes even further.
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5.2 Mechanisms for training classifiers with preferred treat-
ment & preferred impact
For training a classifier adhering to preferred treatment and preferred impact, one can
add the appropriate condition from Eqs. (5.4) and (5.6) in the classifier formulation.
For example, one can train a preferred impact classifier as follows:
minimize
{θz}
∑
θz∈Z L(θz)
subject to Bz(θz) ≥ Bz(θ′z) for all z ∈ Z,
(5.7)
where Dz = {(xi, yi, zi) ∈ D|zi = z} denotes the set of users in the training set sharing
the sensitive feature value z. The constant term Bz(θ′z) is the group benefits for group z
as defined by Eq. (5.1) and can be precomputed for a given parity impact classifier.
Unfortunately, it is quite challenging to solve the above optimization problem since
the constraints (specified using probabilities defined in Eq. (5.1)) are non-convex for
many well-known classifiers (e.g., SVM). Hence, we approximate the group benefits by
using the ramp (convex) function r(a) = max(0, a). The optimization problem hence
becomes:
minimize
{θz}
∑
θz∈Z L(θz)
subject to
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θ
T
z x) ≥
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θ
′
z
Tx) for all z ∈ Z,
(5.8)
which is a disciplined convex-concave program (DCCP) for convex decision boundary-
based classifiers and can be efficiently solved using well-known heuristics such as the one
proposed by Shen et al. (2016b). For example, if we particularize the above formulation
to group-conditional (standard) logistic regression classifiers θ′z and θz and L2-norm
regularizer, then, Eq. (5.8) adopts the following form:
minimize
{θz}
− 1
N
∑
(x,y,z)∈D log p(y|x,θz) +
∑
z∈Z λz||θz||2
subject to
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θ
T
z x) ≥
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θ
′
z
Tx) for all z ∈ Z.
(5.9)
where p(y = 1|x,θz) = 1
1+e−θTz x
. One can similarly particularize the formulation for other
convex boundary-based classifiers like squared loss, linear / non-linear SVMs, etc.
One can train a preferred treatment classifier by solving the following optimization
problem:
minimize
{θz}
∑
θz∈Z L(θz)
subject to Bz(θz) ≥ Bz(θz′) for all z, z′ ∈ Z.
(5.10)
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where the preferred treatment constraints, defined by Eq. (5.4), use empirical estimates
of the group benefits, defined by Eq. (5.1). Note unlike in the case of preferred impact
(Eq. (5.7)), in this case, both the left and right hand sides of the inequalities contain
optimization variables.
However, the constraints in the above problem are non-convex and thus we adopt a
similar strategy as in the case of preferred impact classifiers. More specifically, we solve
instead the following tractable problem:
minimize
{θz}
∑
θz∈Z L(θz)
subject to
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θ
T
z x) ≥
∑
x∈Dz max(0,θz′
Tx) for all z ∈ Z,
(5.11)
which is also a disciplined convex-concave program (DCCP) for convex boundary-based
classifiers.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of preferred treatment and preferred impact
classifiers against unconstrained, treatment parity and impact parity classifiers on a
variety of synthetic and real-world datasets. More specifically, we consider the following
classifiers, which we train to maximize utility subject to the corresponding constraints:
• Uncons: an unconstrained classifier that resorts to group-conditional classifiers. It
violates treatment parity—it trains a separate classifier per sensitive feature value
group—and potentially violates impact parity—it may lead to different benefits for
different groups.
• Parity: a parity classifier that does not use the sensitive feature group information
in the decision making, but only during the training phase, and is constrained
to satisfy both treatment parity—its decisions do not change based on the users’
sensitive feature value as it does not resort to group-conditional classifiers—and
impact parity—it ensures that the benefits for all groups are the same. We train this
classifier using the methodology proposed in Section 3.1.2.
• Preferred treatment: a classifier that resorts to group-conditional classifiers and is
constrained to satisfy preferred treatment—each group gets higher benefit with its
own classifier than any other group’s classifier.
• Preferred impact: a classifier that resorts to group-conditional classifiers and is
constrained to be preferred over the Parity classifier.
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• Preferred both: a classifier that resort to group-conditional classifiers and is con-
strained to satisfy both preferred treatment and preferred impact.
For the experiments in this section, we use logistic regression classifiers with L2-norm
regularization. We randomly split the corresponding dataset into 70%-30% train-test
folds 5 times, and report the average accuracy and group benefits in the test folds.
5.3.1 Synthetic datasets
Experimental setup. Following the setup in Section 3.2.1, we generate a synthetic dataset
in which the unconstrained classifier (Uncons) offers different benefits to each sensitive
feature group. In particular, we generate 20,000 binary class labels y ∈ {−1, 1} uniformly
at random along with their corresponding two-dimensional feature vectors sampled
from the following Gaussian distributions:
p(x|y = 1) = N ([2; 2], [5, 1; 1, 5])
p(x|y = −1) = N ([−2;−2], [10, 1; 1, 3])
Then, we generate each sensitive feature from the Bernoulli distribution p(z =
1) = p(x′|y = 1)/(p(x′|y = 1) + p(x′|y = −1)), where x′ is a rotated version of x,
i.e., x′ = [cos(pi/8),− sin(pi/8); sin(pi/8), cos(pi/8)]. Finally, we train the five classifiers
described above and compute their overall (test) accuracy and (test) group benefits.
Results. Figure 5.3 shows the trained classifiers, along with their overall accuracy and
group benefits. We can make several interesting observations:
The Uncons classifier leads to an accuracy of 0.87, however, the group-conditional
boundaries and high disparity in treatment for the two groups (0.16 vs. 0.85) mean that
it satisfies neither treatment parity nor impact parity. Moreover, it leads to only a small
violation of preferred treatment—benefits for group-0 would increase slightly from 0.16
to 0.20 by adopting the classifier of group-1. However, this will not always be the case,
as we will later show in the experiments on real data.
The Parity classifier satisfies both treatment and impact parity, however, it does so
at a large cost in terms of accuracy, which drops from 0.87 for Uncons to 0.57 for Parity.
The Preferred treatment classifier (not shown in the figure), leads to a minor change
in decision boundaries as compared to the Uncons classifier to achieve preferred treat-
ment. Benefits for group-0 (group-1) with its own classifier are 0.20 (0.84) as compared to
0.17 (0.83) while using the classifier of group-1 (group-0). The accuracy of this classifier
is 0.87.
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The Preferred impact classifier, by making use of a looser notion of nondiscrimination
compared to impact parity, provides higher benefits for both groups at a much smaller
cost in terms of accuracy than the Parity classifier (0.76 vs. 0.57). Note that, while
the Parity classifier achieved equality in benefits by misclassifying negative examples
from group-0 into the positive class and misclassifying positive examples from group-1
into the negative class, the Preferred impact classifier only incurs the former type of
misclassifications. However, the outcomes of the Preferred impact classifier do not satisfy
the preferred treatment criterion: group-1 would attain higher benefit if it used the
classifier of group-0 (0.96 as compared to 0.86).
Finally, the classifier that satisfies preferred treatment and preferred impact (Preferred
both) achieves an accuracy and benefits at par with the Preferred impact classifier.
Next, experiment with a non linearly-separable dataset with a SVM classifier using
radial basis function (RBF) kernel.
Following the setup of Section 3.1.2, we generated a synthetic dataset consisting of
4,000 user binary class labels uniformly at random. We then assign a 2-dimensional user
feature vector to each label by drawing samples from the following distributions:
p(x|y = 1, β) = βN([2; 2], [5 1; 1 5]) + (1− β)N([−2;−2], [10 1; 1 3])
p(x|y = −1, β) = βN([4;−4], [4 4; 2 5]) + (1− β)N([−4; 6], [6 2; 2 3])
where β ∈ {0, 1} is sampled from Bernoulli(0.5). We then generate the corresponding
user sensitive features z by applying the same rotation as for the synthetic dataset in
Figure 5.3.
We then train the various classifiers described at the beginning of the section. The
results are shown in Figure 5.4. Top row in the figure shows the group-conditional
classifiers for group-0, whereas, the bottom row shows the ones for group-1. For the case
of parity classifier, due to treatment parity condition, both groups use the same classifier.
The Uncons classifier leads to an accuracy of 0.96, however, the group-conditional
classifiers lead to high disparity in beneficial outcomes for both groups (0.07 vs. 0.87).
The classifier also leads to a violation of preferred treatment—the benefits for group-0
would increase from 0.07 with its own classifier to 0.17 with the classifier of group-1.
The Parity classifier satisfies both treatment and impact parity, however, it does so
at a large cost in terms of accuracy, which drops from 0.96 for Uncons to 0.61 for Parity.
The Preferred treatment classifier, adjusts the decision boundary for group-0 to
remove envy and does so at a small cost in accuracy (from 0.96 to 0.93).
The Preferred impact classifier, by making use of the relaxed parity-nondiscrimination
conditions, provides higher or equal benefits for both groups at a much smaller cost in
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Acc : 0.87
B0 : 0.16;B1 : 0.77
B0 : 0.20;B1 : 0.85
(a) Uncons
Acc : 0.57
B0 : 0.51;B1 : 0.49
(b) Parity
Acc : 0.76
B0 : 0.58;B1 : 0.96
B0 : 0.21;B1 : 0.86
(c) Preferred impact
Acc : 0.73
B0 : 0.58;B1 : 0.96
B0 : 0.43;B1 : 0.97
(d) Preferred both
Figure 5.3: [Linearly separable synthetic data] Crosses denote group-0 (points with
z = 0) and circles denote group-1. Green points belong to the positive
class in the training data whereas red points belong to the negative class.
Each panel shows the accuracy of the decision making scenario along with
group benefits (B0 and B1) provided by each of the classifiers involved. For
group-conditional classifiers, cyan (blue) line denotes the decision boundary
for the classifier of group-0 (group-1). Parity case (panel (b)) consists of
just one classifier for both groups in order to meet the treatment parity
criterion. Preference-based measures can significantly lower the cost of
nondiscrimination.
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Acc : 0.96;B0 : 0.07;B1 : 0.84 Acc : 0.61;B0 : 0.36;B1 : 0.38 Acc : 0.93;B0 : 0.15;B1 : 0.83 Acc : 0.84;B0 : 0.36;B1 : 0.88
Acc : 0.96;B0 : 0.07;B1 : 0.84
(a) Uncons
Acc : 0.61;B0 : 0.36;B1 : 0.38
(b) Parity
Acc : 0.93;B0 : 0.15;B1 : 0.83
(c) Uncons
Acc : 0.84;B0 : 0.36;B1 : 0.88
(d) Parity
Figure 5.4: [Non- linearly-separable synthetic data] Crosses denote group-0 (points with z = 0) and circles denote group-1.
Green points belong to the positive class in the training data whereas red points belong to the negative class. Each
panel shows the classifiers with top row containing the classifiers for group-0 and the bottom for group-1, along
with the overall accuracy as well as the group benefits (B0 and B1) provided by each of the classifiers involved. For
parity classifier, no group-conditional classifiers are allowed, so both top and bottom row contain the same classifier.
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NYPD SQF dataset
Figure 5.5: [Real-world datasets] The figure shows the accuracy and benefits received by
the two groups for various decision making scenarios. ‘Prf-treat.’, ‘Prf-imp.’,
and ‘Prf-both’ respectively correspond to the classifiers satisfying preferred
treatment, preferred impact, and both preferred treatment and impact criteria.
Sensitive feature values 0 and 1 denote blacks and whites in ProPublica
COMPAS dataset and NYPD SQF datasets, and women and men in the Adult
dataset. Bi(θj) denotes the benefits obtained by group i when using the
classifier of group j. For the Parity case, we train just one classifier for both
the groups, so the benefits do not change by adopting other group’s classifier.
terms of accuracy than the Parity classifier (0.84 vs. 0.61). The preferred impact classifier
in this case also satisfies the preferred treatment criterion.
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5.3.2 Real-world datasets
We experiment with three real-world datasets: the COMPAS recidivism prediction
dataset, the Adult income dataset, and the New York Police Department (NYPD) Stop-
question-and-frisk (SQF) dataset.
Results. Figure 5.5 shows the accuracy achieved by the five classifiers described above
along with the benefits they provide for the three datasets. We can draw several interest-
ing observations:20
In all cases, the Uncons classifier, in addition to violating treatment parity (a separate
classifier for each group) and impact parity (high disparity in group benefits), also
violates the preferred treatment criterion (in all cases, at least one of group-0 or group-1
would benefit more by adopting the other group’s classifier). On the other hand, the
Parity classifier satisfies the treatment parity and impact parity but it does so at a large
cost in terms of accuracy.
The Preferred treatment classifier provides a much higher accuracy than the Parity
classifier—its accuracy is at par with that of the Uncons classifier—while satisfying the
preferred treatment criterion. However, it does not meet the preferred impact criterion.
The Preferred impact classifier meets the preferred impact criterion but does not always
satisfy preferred treatment. Moreover, it also leads to a better accuracy then Parity
classifier in all cases. However, the gain in accuracy is more substantial for the SQF
datasets as compared to the COMPAS and Adult dataset.
The classifier satisfying preferred treatment and preferred impact (Preferred both)
has a somewhat underwhelming performance in terms of accuracy for the Adult dataset.
While the performance of this classifier is better than the Parity classifier in the COMPAS
dataset and NYPD SQF dataset, it is slightly worse for the Adult dataset.
In summary, the above results show that ensuring either preferred treatment or
preferred impact is less costly in terms of accuracy loss than ensuring parity-based
nondiscrimination, however, ensuring both preferred treatment and preferred impact
can lead to comparatively larger accuracy loss in certain datasets. We hypothesize that
this loss in accuracy may be partly due to splitting the number of available samples into
groups during training—each group-conditional classifier use only samples from the
corresponding sensitive feature group—hence decreasing the effectiveness of empirical
risk minimization.
20The directionality of discrimination in the SQF dataset is different from what one would expect (NY-
CLU, 2018)—an unconstrained classifier gives more benefits to African-Americans as compared to whites.
This is due to the fact that a larger fraction of stopped whites were found to be in possession on an illegal
weapon (Tables A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A).
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5.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced two preference-based notions of nondiscrimination—
preferred treatment and preferred impact—establishing a previously unexplored con-
nection between discrimination-aware machine learning and the economics and game
theoretic concepts of envy-freeness and bargaining. Then, we proposed tractable proxies
to design boundary-based classifiers satisfying these notions and experimented with a
variety of synthetic and real-world datasets, showing that preference-based nondiscrimi-
nation often allows for greater decision accuracy than existing parity-based notions.
Our work opens many promising avenues for future work. For example, our method-
ology, just like the previous chapters, is limited to convex boundary-based classifiers. A
natural follow up would be to extend our methodology to other types of classifiers, e.g.,
neural networks and decision trees.
Further refinements to our notions based on corresponding ideas from fair-division
literature (i.e., envy-freeness and bargaining) are also possible. For example, we defined
preferred treatment and preferred impact in the context of group preferences, however,
it would be worth revisiting the proposed definitions in the context of individual prefer-
ences (e.g., envy-freeness at the level of individuals). Similarly, while we only explored
group preferences without considering the qualifications of the users, one could extend
these notions to take into account the qualifications when satisfying these preferences.
For example, in envy-free rent division (Gal et al., 2016), while different users have
certain room preferences, one aims at satisfying the envy-freeness criterion while taking
into account the price each user is willing to pay for their preferred rooms (i.e., one also
considers the “user qualifications”).
The fair division literature also establishes a variety of fairness axioms (Nash Jr, 1950)
such as Pareto-optimality and scale invariance. It would be interesting to study such
axioms in the context of discrimination-aware machine learning.
We also note that while moving from parity to preference-based nondiscrimination
offers many attractive properties, we acknowledge it may not always be the most ap-
propriate notion—in some scenarios, parity-based nondiscrimination may very well
present the eventual goal and be more desirable. An example of such cases would
be the diversity-enhancing schemes that aim at redressing historical discrimination by
encouraging proportionality in beneficial outcome rates for different groups (MacCarthy,
2017; Siegel, 2014).
CHAPTER 6
Related work
In this chapter, we review work from various fields related to the area of discrimination-
aware algorithmic decision making.
6.1 A brief overview of algorithmic decision making in
social domains
Usage of algorithmic decision making in social domains has a long history.
For example, the first studies on usage of algorithmic decision making in predicting
parole violations dates back to the 1920s. Hart (1923), Burgess (1928) and Tibbitts (1931)
conducted one of the very first studies to evaluate the potential of predicting the risk of
parole violation based on several related factors such as the type of offense committed
by a defendant, employment status, etc.21 The first examples of real-world deployment
algorithms for predicting parole date back to the 1970s (Hoffman and Beck, 1974). Since
then, the usage of algorithmic decision making in criminal risk assessment has risen
significantly, with a number of jurisdictions in the US deploying automated software
for risk prediction. For more details, we point the interested reader to Kehl and Kessler
(2017). At this point, it is important to note that parole or recidivism risk assessment
algorithms are mostly used as a tool to assist human decision makers, rather than entirely
replacing them (Kehl and Kessler, 2017).
Similarly, the use of algorithmic decision making in credit scoring also goes back
around six decades. For example, FICO scores have been being used in the US since the
1950s (FICO, 2018a). FICO (and similar) scores are used by a large number of financial
institutions to assess the creditworthiness of their clients (FICO, 2018a) and are based on
factors such as the payment history of the client, debt burden etc. (FICO, 2018b).
21Interestingly, “national or racial origin”—an attribute now regarded as protected—was also a factor in
these early models (Tibbitts, 1931).
Chapter 6. Related work 79
While certain applications such as criminal risk assessment and credit have a long
history of usage of algorithmic decision making, the number of applications where
algorithmic decision making is now being used to assist or replace human decision
making has risen significantly in past few years. These applications span both offline as
well as online worlds.
For example, in the offline world, predictive policing algorithms, such as PredPol, are
increasingly being used across the US (Mohler et al., 2015; Perry, 2013). These algorithms
operate by analyzing the historical data about crimes in a set of locations and determine
how to allocate police officers in different locations to reduce crime. Usage of these
algorithms follows the idea that concentrated police deployment in crime “hotspot areas”
can help reduce crime (Mohler et al., 2015). In the online world, algorithmic decisions
are also used for tasks such as matching potential job seekers with employers (Chandler,
2017; Posse, 2016; Woods, 2011) based on factors such as technical skills mentioned in
resume, and recommending online content to web users (Covington et al., 2016; Graepel
et al., 2010) based on factors such as users’ query history.
6.2 Avoiding discrimination in classification
In this section, we will discuss techniques that aim to remove disparate treatment,
disparate impact or disparate mistreatment from classification outcomes. To the best
of our knowledge, no related techniques have been proposed to control for preferred
treatment and preferred impact.
The first study on discrimination-free classification dates back to 2008 when Pe-
dreschi et al. (2008) proposed techniques to avoid discrimination in classification rule
mining. In the years that followed, a number of studies proposed techniques to remove
discrimination from classification outcomes. Especially, last year or so has seen a flurry
of methods proposed to control discrimination in classification. These studies operate
by first specifying one or more measures of discrimination that they aim to control,
i.e., disparate treatment, disparate impact or disparate mistreatment, and then propose
techniques to control for the selected measure(s).
These techniques can be divided into three different categories: pre-processing, in-
processing and post-processing. Below, we discuss each of these categories separately.
6.2.1 Pre-processing
This technique consists of pre-processing the training data that would later be fed to a
training algorithm (Calmon et al., 2017; Feldman et al., 2015; Kamiran and Calders, 2010;
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Luong et al., 2011). The goal is to pre-process the training data such that any classification
algorithm trained on this data would generate discrimination-free outcomes. This
strategy can be roughly divided into two different sub-categories. Below, we briefly
discuss these subcategories:
The first sub-category involves changing the values of class labels for certain data
points (Kamiran and Calders, 2010; Luong et al., 2011). For example, Kamiran and
Calders (2010) propose a pre-processing technique that operates by first training an
unconstrained classifier, and then moving / duplicating the data points from the group
with lower acceptance rate (as compared to the other group) until the classification
outcomes are free of disparate impact.
The second sub-category involves perturbing the non-sensitive features (Feldman
et al., 2015), or mapping the data to a transformed space (Calmon et al., 2017). For
example, building on ideas in the area of privacy-preserving data analysis (specifically
t-closeness), Feldman et al. (2015) “repair” the non-sensitive features such that it is
impossible to predict the sensitive features from non-sensitive features (which in turn
means that the classifier trained on this data will not incur disparate impact), while
ensuring that the resulting distribution is close to the original data distribution.
On the plus side, the pre-processing techniques have an advantage that the trans-
formed dataset can be used to train any downstream algorithm.
However, these techniques also suffer from some disadvantages. First, since these
techniques are not optimized for any specific classification model, and treat the learning
algorithm as a black box, as a consequence, the pre-processing can lead to unpredictable
loss in accuracy or may not remove discrimination on the test data (as we saw in
Section 3.2.2). Furthermore, transforming the dataset might also affect the explainability
of the classifier—e.g., since the feature values were transformed during pre-processing,
the feature weights of a linear classifiers might not be interpretable anymore.
6.2.2 In-processing
The second strategy consists of modifying the training procedure of the classifier. Ex-
amples of this scheme include Calders and Verwer (2010); Goh et al. (2016); Kamiran
et al. (2010); Kamishima et al. (2011); Quadrianto and Sharmanska (2017); Woodworth
et al. (2017). Our proposed covariance constraints in Chapters 3 and 4 also fall under this
category.
For example, the technique by Kamishima et al. (2011)—which is only limited to
a logistic regression classifier—works by adding a regularization term in the objective
that penalizes the mutual information between the sensitive feature and the classifier
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Method Type DT DI DM BN
Polyvalent
sens.
Multiple
sens.
Range of
classifiers
Our framework (Chapters 3 and 4) In 3 3 3 3 3 3 Any convex margin-based
Kamiran and Calders (2010) Pre 3 3 7 7 7 7 Any score-based
Calders and Verwer (2010) In/Post 3 3 7 7 7 7 Naive Bayes
Kamiran et al. (2010) In 3 3 7 7 7 7 Decision tree
Luong et al. (2011) Pre 3 7 7 7 7 7 Any
Kamishima et al. (2011) In 7 3 7 7 7 7 Logistic regression
Zemel et al. (2013) Pre/In 3 3 7 7 7 7 Log loss
Feldman et al. (2015) Pre 3 3 7 7 3 3 Any (only numerical features)
Goh et al. (2016) In 3 3 3 7 3 3 Ramp loss
Hardt et al. (2016) Post 7 7 3 7 3 3 Any score-based
Corbett-Davies et al. (2017b) Post 7 3 3 7 3 3 Any score-based
Woodworth et al. (2017) In 7 7 3 7 7 7 Any convex linear
Quadrianto and Sharmanska (2017) In 3 3 3 7 7 7 Hinge loss
Calmon et al. (2017) Pre 3 3 7 7 3 3 Any
Dwork et al. (2018) In/Post 7 3 3 7 3 3 Any score-based
Menon and Williamson (2018) Post 7 3 3 7 7 7 Any score-based
Table 6.1: Capabilities of different methods in eliminating disparate treatment (DT), disparate impact (DI) and disparate
mistreatment (DM). We also show the type of each method: pre-processing (pre), in-processing (in) and post-
processing (post). None of the prior methods addresses disparate impact’s business necessity (BN) clause. Many of
the methods do not generalize to multiple (e.g., gender and race) or polyvalent sensitive features (e.g., race, that has
more than two values). The strategy by (Feldman et al., 2015) is limited to only numerical non-sensitive features.
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decisions. The method of Kamiran et al. (2010), which is limited to a decision tree
classifier, operates by changing the splitting or the leaf node labeling criterion of the tree
learning phase to remove disparate impact.
Goh et al. (2016), Woodworth et al. (2017) and Quadrianto and Sharmanska (2017)
on the other hand suggest adding constraints similar to ours to the classification model.
However, their works are only limited to a single specific loss function (Goh et al., 2016;
Quadrianto and Sharmanska, 2017) or to a single notion of discrimination (Woodworth
et al., 2017).
Finally, Zemel et al. (2013), building on Dwork et al. (2012), combined pre-processing
and in-processing by jointly learning a ‘fair’ representation of the data and the classifier
parameters. The joint representation is learnt using a multi-objective loss function that
ensures that (i) the resulting representations do not lead to disparate impact, (ii) the
reconstruction loss from the original data and intermediate representations is small and
(iii) the class label can be predicted with high accuracy. This approach has two main
limitations: i) it leads to a non-convex optimization problem and does not guarantee
optimality, and ii) the accuracy of the classifier depends on the dimension of the fair
representation, which needs to be chosen rather arbitrarily.
6.2.3 Post-processing
The third and final strategy consists of post-processing the classifier scores such that the
new outcomes contain no disparate impact or disparate mistreatment (Corbett-Davies
et al., 2017b; Dwork et al., 2018; Hardt et al., 2016; Menon and Williamson, 2018).
This approach usually involves learning different decision thresholds for a given
score function to remove discrimination (specifically, disparate impact or disparate
mistreatment). However, since these strategies require the sensitive feature information
at the decision time, they cannot be used in cases where sensitive feature information is
unavailable (e.g., due to privacy reasons) or prohibited from being used due to disparate
treatment laws (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). For further discussion on using the sensitive
feature information at the decision time, see Sections 7.1 and 7.2.
Dwork et al. (2018) combine the in-processing and post-processing scheme by first
training a number of classifiers for each group (with each classifier having different
acceptance rate for the given group), and then selecting the group-conditional classifiers
that minimize a certain loss function. The loss function is formulated as a combination
of the loss in accuracy and a penalty term penalizing the deviation from the nondiscrimi-
nation goal. Like Hardt et al. (2016) and Corbett-Davies et al. (2017b), this method too
requires access to the sensitive feature information at the decision time.
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In addition to the issues discussed above, prior studies suffer from one or more of
the following limitations: (i) they only accommodate a single, binary sensitive feature,
(ii) they are restricted to a narrow range of classifiers, and, (iii) they cannot accommodate
multiple discrimination notions simultaneously. Table 6.1 compares the capabilities of
different methods in meeting different nondiscrimination goals.
Finally, some recent studies (Kilbertus et al., 2017; Kusner et al., 2017) focus on
detecting and removing discrimination by leveraging causal inference techniques. How-
ever, these studies often require access to causal graphs specifying causal relationships
between different features, which can be quite challenging to obtain in practice.
6.3 Fairness beyond discrimination
Notice that in this thesis, our focus was mostly on discrimination. As noted in
Section 2.1, discrimination inherently involves imposition on wrongful relative disadvan-
tage on “salient social groups”. However, unfair treatment of persons can be carried out
without regard to their salient social group membership. This kind of disadvantageous
treatment is often referred to as individual unfairness in the machine learning literature.
On the other hand, the discrimination measures discussed in this thesis (e.g., disparate
impact and disparate mistreatment) are often referred to as group fairness measures.
Dwork et al. (2012) were the first to formalize the idea of individual fairness. Their
idea of individual fairness follows the insight that similar individuals must be treated
similarly by the machine learning algorithm. A task specific measure is required to
compute the similarity of individuals. Then, they formalize their individual fairness
notion using a Lipschitz condition. They also propose mechanisms to achieve individual
fairness. In a recent work, Rothblum and Yona (2018) propose mechanisms to alleviate
the generalizability and computational intractability problems faced by the method
of Dwork et al. (2012).
In a recent study, Speicher et al. (2018) propose another measure for individual
fairness. This study argues that while two classifiers violating the Lipschitz condition
of Dwork et al. would be deemed individually unfair, it is not clear which of the two
classifiers is more unfair. They also note that while Dwork et al.’s notions of individual
fairness aims at treating similar individuals similarly, it does not take into account
the actual qualification (or degree of deservedness) of the individuals. Speicher et al.
then propose a new measure of individual fairness that can potentially overcome these
issues. Their measure uses inequality indices (specifically, generalized entropy indices)
to quantify individual unfairness in the outcomes of a classifier. Using the subgroup
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decomposibility property of inequality indices, Speicher et al. also formalize the link
between the individual unfairness, group unfairness and between-group unfairness of a
classifier.
Finally, while discrimination is related to a very specific notion (discussed in detail
in Section 2.1), the idea of fairness or justice in law, moral philosophy and ethics spans a
much broader ground (Arneson, 2015; Gosepath, 2011; Miller, 2017; Rawls, 2009).
6.4 Connecting various notions of fairness and nondiscrim-
ination
Since we have discussed a number of notions of fairness and nondiscrimination leading
up to this point, in this section, we provide a high level view of these notions, and
compare / contrast them with each other.
Table 6.2 provides an overview of these notions. As the table shows, the fairness
notions can be divided into individual-level fairness notions or group-level notions. As
discussed in Section 6.3 individual unfairness can be detected / measured using the
methods described in Dwork et al. (2012) or Speicher et al. (2018).
The group unfairness on the other hand can be measured using parity-based notions
of disparate treatment, disparate impact or disparate mistreatment. The table also shows
the conditions imposed by each of these notions. For example, removing disparate
treatment requires that changing the sensitive feature (with all other features being the
same) should not change the decision of the classifier for an individual.22
The group unfairness can also be measured using preference-based notions of pre-
ferred treatment and preferred impact. Note that while the parity-based notions draw
inspiration from anti-discrimination legislation in various countries (Chapters 2, 4), the
preference-based notions are inspired by ideas in economics and game theory (Chap-
ter 5). Moreover, the preference-based notions also provide better accuracy than their
parity-based counterparts.
Finally, while we do not focus on that in this thesis, defining and characterizing
preference-based counterparts of disparate mistreatment would be an interesting avenue
for future work.
22For a discussion into implicit disparate treatment, i.e., disparate treatment via proxy features, see
Section 2.4.
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Type Notions
Individual fairness Similar individuals receive similar outcomes (Dwork et al., 2012), or, individuals de-
serving similar outcomes receive similar outcomes (Speicher et al., 2018)
Group
fairness
No disparate treatment / Parity treatment Preferred treatment
Changing the sensitive feature does not
change the chance of positive class outcome.
Changing the sensitive feature does not im-
prove the chance of positive class outcome
(at the level of groups).
Provides better accuracy than parity treat-
ment.
No disparate impact / Parity impact Preferred impact
Positive class outcome rate similar for all
groups.
Positive class outcome rate at least as much
as parity impact for all groups.
Provides better accuracy than parity impact.
No disparate mistreatment
Prediction accuracy or its components, i.e., false positive rate, false negative rate, false
omission rate and false discovery rate are the same for all groups.
Table 6.2: A broad overview of different notions of fairness / nondiscrimination in the machine learning literature.
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6.5 Distributive vs. procedural fairness
Note that almost all the fairness and discrimination notions discussed until this point are
concerned with the distribution of outcomes (among groups in the case of discrimination
or group fairness, and among individuals in the case of individual fairness).
Drawing inspiration from the rich literature in organizational justice (Greenberg,
1987), some recent studies shed light on other aspects of fairness, such as procedural
fairness (Grgic-Hlaca et al., 2018a,b). While distributive fairness refers to the fairness of
outcomes, procedural fairness relates to the process that leads to these outcomes.
Grgic-Hlaca et al. (2018b) note that using certain features might be deemed procedu-
rally unfair (e.g., criminal history of a defendant’s father while accessing the recidivism
risk of the defendant) even when this usage leads to fair outcomes. They further note that
the machine learning models aiming to achieve fairness in outcomes might overlook the
other important properties of the features that might cause those features to be deemed
as unfair. Some examples of these properties are: feature volitionality, i.e., whether the
feature value presents the volition of the person under consideration (e.g., the criminal
history of the father is a non-volitional feature which the defendant might not have
any control over); feature privacy, i.e., whether the collection of the feature violates the
privacy of the person under consideration, etc. Grgic-Hlaca et al. (2018b) then propose
methods to quantify the procedural fairness of a classification task, and also propose
mechanisms to train procedurally fair classifiers.
In a follow on work, Grgic-Hlaca et al. (2018a) conduct studies to analyze why, in
addition to the reasons mentioned above, people deem usage of certain features as unfair.
Some of these additional reasons are: the usage of the feature perpetuating a vicious cycle
of trapping people in risky behavior, the feature in fact being caused by the sensitive
feature of the person itself, etc.
6.6 Fairness beyond binary classification
While the focus of this thesis has been on discrimination in binary classification, there
have been a number of studies in the broader area of data mining and machine learning
that tackle fairness and discrimination issues. We review some of this work below.
Pedreschi et al. (2008) focus on discrimination in classification rule mining. They
first define the notions of direct and indirect discrimination in the context of rule mining,
and then propose schemes to eliminate discrimination. The latter is achieved by distort-
ing the training dataset such that the classification rules learned on this dataset would
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be non-discriminatory. The aim of this scheme is to generate and release a “cleaned”
dataset to third parties. Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer (2013) propose new methods that
overcome the limitations of Pedreschi et al. (2008). More details about this line of work
can be found in Hajian et al. (2016).
Yang and Stoyanovich (2017) focus on measuring fairness in ranking outcomes.
Their measure follows the intuitive idea that in the output of a ranking system, items
ranked towards the top tend to receive greater attention. Consequently, a fairness-aware
ranker might want to ensure equal representation from different socially salient groups
at the top ranks. They also propose mechanisms to learn fair rankings. A number of
other studies have since proposed mechanisms for learning group-fair rankings (Singh
and Joachims, 2018; Zehlike et al., 2017). In a recent work, (Biega et al., 2018) move
beyond the ideas of group fairness in ranking and focus on individual fairness.
Berk et al. (2017) formalize fairness in the context of regression tasks. Specifically,
they present different measure of fairness in regression tasks that are inspired by the
ideas of individual fairness, disparate impact and disparate mistreatment in a binary
classification setting. They further propose convex mechanisms to include these fairness
criteria in the training of regressions tasks as regularization terms. Finally, they study
the tradeoffs between fairness and accuracy in the regression setting.
Furthermore, other studies have also looked at fairness issues in voting (Celis et al.,
2017), recommendations and personalization (Burke et al., 2018; Celis and Vishnoi,
2017; Yao and Huang, 2017), clustering (Chierichetti et al., 2017), representation learn-
ing (Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Edwards and Storkey, 2016; Louizos et al., 2016; Madras et al.,
2018), data summarization (Celis et al., 2018; Kazemi et al., 2018), bandits (Joseph et al.,
2016) and reinforcement learning (Doroudi et al., 2017; Jabbari et al., 2016).
6.7 Fairness over time
Some recent studies have also looked at the temporal aspect of fairness and discrimina-
tion in algorithmic decision making.
Ensign et al. (2018) study the problem of feedback loops in predictive policing.
Specifically, by making a distinction between the reported crime incidents and the
discovered crime incidents, they show that deploying police personnel based on crime
history of a specific neighborhood can potentially lead to feedback loops that might
result in over-policing of certain areas. Lum and Isaac (2016) show a similar insight.
Liu et al. (2018) study the effect of applying nondiscrimination mechanisms on
algorithmic decision making outcomes. They show that while the goal of these corrective
measures might be to remove the effects of historical discrimination, depending on
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various underlying factors, in the long run, these corrective measures can have a positive,
neutral or even negative impact on the benefits received by the historically discriminated
groups.
These studies point to the need of performing careful domain-specific analysis before
applying (1) algorithmic decision making and (2) nondiscrimination mechanisms in
real-world applications.
CHAPTER 7
Discussion, limitations & future work
In this section, we discuss some consequential points that follow from the prior chapters,
mention the limitations of our work, and explore avenues for future work.
7.1 Achieving optimal tradeoffs between nondiscrimina-
tion and accuracy
In this thesis, we proposed constraints based on distance from decision boundary for
controlling various forms of discrimination (e.g., disparate impact, disparate mistreat-
ment). However, we note that these constraints are merely proxies for the positive
class acceptance rate (in the case of disparate impact, preferred treatment and preferred
impact) and misclassification rates (in the case of disparate mistreatment), and might not
lead to optimal results in terms of tradeoffs between nondiscrimination and accuracy. In
this section, we discuss some result from the machine learning literature regarding the
optimality of these tradeoffs.
Corbett-Davies et al. (2017b) were the first to theoretically quantify the tradeoffs
between nondiscrimination and accuracy.23 Specifically, they show that to achieve
optimal classification performance (i.e., the immediate utility) under disparate impact
and disparate mistreatment constraints, the classifier should apply separate thresholds
for each sensitive feature group. Lipton et al. (2017) and Menon and Williamson (2018)
derive the same result for classification accuracy (instead of immediate utility), and show
that constraint-based mechanisms, such as ours, that do not use the sensitive feature
23Corbett-Davies et al. (2017b) study the problem of algorithmic nondiscrimination from the perspective
of bail decisions and public safety. Public safety here is related to whether or not a defendant would go
on to commit a crime, if released. Consequently, instead of using the classification accuracy, they study
a slightly different objective that they refer to as ‘immediate utility’. This objective is formulated as a
combination of the utility of a classifier and the cost of detaining individuals. As Corbett-Davies et al.
(2017b) mention, and Lipton et al. (2017) show, this objective can also be reformulated as the classification
accuracy, and the takeaways would stay the same.
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will have an accuracy that is lower than, or at best equal to the one achieved by setting
different thresholds.
These results suggest that to get optimal tradeoffs between nondiscrimination and
accuracy, one should first train an accuracy-maximizing classifier, and then set the
separate decision thresholds in a post-processing step. However, we note two important
points regarding these results:
First, the results assume that the decision maker has access to the Bayes optimal
predictor. However, access to Bayes optimal predictors with finite datasets (as is often
the case in real-world) might not be possible. In fact, Woodworth et al. (2017) show that
in the absence of the Bayes optimal predictor, the post-processing scheme can lead to
non-optimal results. They further argue that for achieving optimal tradeoffs, one would
need to include the nondiscrimination criteria in the design of the learning algorithm
itself. Woodworth et al. (2017) also present an in-processing training scheme with finite
sample guarantees. However, as they discuss, the guarantees only hold under strong
distributional assumptions.
Second, since the post-processing schemes achieve nondiscrimination by setting
different thresholds for different sensitive feature groups, they need access to the sensitive
feature value at the decision time. However, the sensitive feature value might not always
be available at the decision time due to privacy reasons, or might be prohibited from
being used due to disparate treatment laws. Specifically, when using the post-processing
schemes, a black-box audit of the algorithm to check if it satisfies the disparate treatment
criterion (Eq. 2.6) would show that the classifier gives different outcomes to persons who
are the same along all features except for their sensitive features.24
On the other hand, the in-processing schemes proposed in this thesis can operate
without using the sensitive feature at the decision time. Rather than setting different deci-
sion thresholds for different groups, these schemes readjust the weights on the non-sensitive
features such that the final outcomes satisfy the given nondiscrimination criteria (e.g.,
disparate impact, disparate mistreatment). Of course, an adversarial system designer
with the intent to discriminate can use a shadow feature that is highly predictive of the
sensitive feature (e.g., using neighborhood to predict race, also known as redlining) to
pass the audit for explicit or formal disparate treatment. However, these scenarios can
be prevented by judging the procedural fairness (or the fairness of feature usage) as
suggested by Grgic-Hlaca et al. (2018a,b). Additionally, as Siegel (2014) and Primus
(2003) note, disparate impact might be used as a tool to root out such facially neutral,
24A similar audit is suggested by Kroll et al. (2016).
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yet covert intentional discrimination. We further expand on the legal aspects of this
discussion in Section 7.2.
Finally, coming back to optimal nondiscrimination accuracy tradeoffs, as the exper-
iments in Sections 3.2.2 and 4.4.2 show, our constraint based schemes achieve similar
accuracy for the same level of discrimination as the post-processing schemes when using
the sensitive feature at the decision time. However, we note that for some datasets
(Section 3.2.2), as opposed to the post-processing schemes, our scheme does not always
completely remove discrimination. This may be due to the fact that our scheme relies on a
proxy (covariance between the sensitive feature value and distance from decision bound-
ary) to achieve nondiscrimination, while the post-processing schemes directly adjust
the per-group decision thresholds to satisfy nondiscrimination criteria. Regardless, ex-
ploring further proxies, possibly with guarantees regarding nondiscrimination-accuracy
tradeoffs would definitely be an important future research direction.
We next discuss some potential legal issues related to the usage of sensitive features
at the decision time.
7.2 Directly using sensitive features to avoid disparate im-
pact or disparate mistreatment
Continuing our discussion on in-processing vs. post-processing schemes, in this section
we discuss the legal issues that might arise as a result of setting different decision
thresholds for different sensitive feature groups in order to remove disparate impact or
disparate mistreatment.
While some studies argue for explicitly using sensitive features in making deci-
sions (Berk, 2009; Lipton et al., 2017), such schemes might face legal issues due to
violation of disparate treatment and equal protection laws (Barocas and Selbst, 2016).
Specifically, in the context of discrimination-aware decision making, explicitly using
sensitive features would be a subject to a strict scrutiny (Wex, 2018) by courts, even if the
goal of these schemes is to remove the effects of historical discrimination and “even if
the consideration of race is but one factor in a holistic review” (MacCarthy, 2017).
However, as MacCarthy (2017) notes, using other (non-sensitive) features to achieve
the same goals may not trigger strict scrutiny. Specifically, while reviewing various
recent US Supreme Court verdicts concerning anti-discrimination practices, MacCarthy
(2017) states:
“The implication Inclusive Communities has for designing or modifying
algorithms to avoid a disparate impact seems clear: if the objective is to close
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a racial gap, or by implication a gap with respect to any protected class, then
modification of the algorithm with variables that do not explicitly refer to
group membership would not trigger strict scrutiny. This would be true even
if the variables correlated with group membership. The examples used in
this case clarify the kind of variable that would not trigger strict scrutiny
of a modified algorithm: low income areas, the financial feasibility of the
development project, the income level of tenants, neighborhoods with good
schools, high crime areas, and neighborhoods near landfills.
The Court seems to be concerned about variables that explicitly refer to
group membership. Case commentary also suggests incorporating variables
explicitly referring to group membership into an algorithm for the purpose of
making it less impactful on protected groups would trigger strict scrutiny.”
Siegel (2014) expresses a similar opinion on the matter as well.
However, it is important to note that such debates on whether or not the sensitive
feature should be used directly for the sake of redressing historical discrimination are still
ongoing, and as noted by the authors, the current studies are by no means the final word
on the matter (MacCarthy, 2017). Further progress on policy front would be required
to solve this, and several other issue related to the broader topic of (discrimination in)
algorithmic decision making (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017a; Kim,
2017; Kroll et al., 2016). Another related issue could be to clarify whether or not the
explicit usage of sensitive feature at only the training stage, but not at the decision time,
would trigger strict scrutiny.
7.3 Achieving nondiscrimination without sacrificing accu-
racy
Notice that until now, we only discussed mechanisms to remove discrimination (via
pre/in/post-processing) while using the same training dataset.
However, various authors note that apparent disparities in beneficial outcomes may
also be caused by training datasets that may be non-representative of the groups under
consideration (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017b; Hardt, 2014; Hardt
et al., 2016) and the best course of action in such cases might be to gather appropriate
training datasets.
For example, one might be learning from a training dataset with very few examples
from certain minority groups (these scenarios can arise easily since minorities or pro-
tected groups by definition tend to be represented less in certain domains). Having fewer
Chapter 7. Discussion, limitations & future work 93
examples from these groups would mean that the standard empirical risk minimization
algorithms would lead to poorly fit models for these groups (Amodei et al., 2016; Bishop,
2006; Hashimoto et al., 2018). Gathering more data in such cases could potentially alle-
viate discrimination issues, without even needing any discrimination-aware learning
scheme, and consequently, without having to sacrifice the classification accuracy.
Another issue that can potentially arise is the use of inadequate feature sets, that is,
using features that are too coarse-grained or have vastly different predictive power for
different groups. A classical example of the usage of coarse-grained features could be a
scenario where a creditor could deny loans to whole neighborhoods based on the fact
that people from that neighborhood tend not to return their loans. However, since the
location in many cases can correlate with the racial makeup of a community, this practice
could result in the decision making (intentionally or unintentionally) disproportionately
denying loans to certain racial groups. In this case, using more fine-grained features such
as individual attributes rather than neighborhood risk averages could potentially reduce
such discrimination (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; MacCarthy, 2017). Similarly, discarding
features with vastly different predictive power for different groups,25 and gathering
alternative feature sets can also help reduce discrimination.
Similarly, deferring decisions and gathering more information about training exam-
ples (Madras et al., 2017; Nan and Saligrama, 2017; Trapeznikov and Saligrama, 2013)
based on the confidence of the algorithmic decision making system can also help reduce
discrimination without having to sacrifice classification accuracy.
Further exploration of schemes related to augmenting existing training datasets with
the goal of reducing nondiscrimination—perhaps along the lines of active learning (Tong
and Koller, 2001), or using models with good uncertainty estimates and leveraging this
uncertainty to gather more data in parts of feature space with the most variance (Ras-
mussen and Williams, 2005)—would be a very interesting avenue for future work.
7.4 Suitability of different measures of fairness and nondis-
crimination
As noted throughout this thesis (see, e.g., Sections 2.2.2, 4.1 and 5.4), discrimination
is a highly domain- and context-specific notion, and consequently, different notions of
discrimination are suitable for different application scenarios. As a result, a careful analysis
should be carried out before a specific measure of nondiscrimination is chosen, and
25As shown by a 2007 FTC analysis of credit-based insurance scores, only dropping features in order to
reduce outcome disparities may severely reduce the performance of the predictor (FTC, 2007).
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before an algorithm is modified to satisfy that measure.26 In this regard, some recent
studies have explored potential issues that might arise when applying various notions of
discrimination and unfairness without careful analysis of the underlying context.
Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018) argue that under certain situations, various discrimi-
nation measures such as well-calibration and false positive rates might not align well
with the intended policy objectives. For example, they note that when the base rates for
various sensitive feature groups differ, even the very high quality (accuracy maximizing)
predictions could lead to differences between the false positive rates of the groups (of
course, given that the predictions are not perfect).
Similarly, Speicher et al. (2018) show that removing discrimination—e.g., removing
disparity in false positive rates—could potentially make the outcomes more unfair at
the level of individuals (for background on individual unfairness, see Section 6.3). They
also show that unless a classifier separates the positive and negative class perfectly,
maximizing prediction accuracy would not lead to the classifier maximizing individual
level unfairness.
Addressing these limitations and tradeoffs would probably require efforts on both
legal and technical front, and would be an interesting avenue for future work.
26In fact, as mentioned in Section 7.3, careful gathering of training datasets might already obviate the
need for such corrective measures.
Conclusion
In this thesis, we tried to address the problem of discrimination in algorithmic decision
making. First, we proposed mechanisms to limit discrimination in algorithmic decision
outcomes. These mechanisms can be configured to operate with a wide range of classifi-
cation models, and also provide the flexibility to accommodate other useful properties
such as ensuring nondiscrimination with respect to multiple groupings of users (e.g.,
along gender and race simultaneously), and preventing misclassifications for certain sets
of users while training nondiscriminatory models. After noticing that existing measures
of discrimination might not be suitable for certain application scenarios, we also propose
new measures of nondiscrimination (and propose mechanisms for these new measures).
One important takeaway that comes out is that there will probably not be a single uni-
versal measure of nondiscrimination in machine learning, and different measures will
likely need to be applied in different situations.
We notice that several open challenges remain both on the technical as well as the
policy fronts (discussed in detail in Chapter 7). Solving these challenges will require (a
possibly interdisciplinary) effort on both fronts.
Finally, a code implementation of all the mechanisms proposed in this thesis is
available at:
https://github.com/mbilalzafar/fair-classification
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APPENDIX A
Dataset statistics
—The Adult dataset (Adult, 1996): We consider gender and race as sensitive features.
Gender Income ≤ 50K Income > 50K Total
Males 20,988(69%) 9,539(31%) 30,527
Females 13,026(89%) 1,669(11%) 14, 695
Total 34,014(75%) 11,208(25%) 45,222
Table A.1: [Adult dataset] Class distribution for different genders. The classes are:
whether a person earns more than 50K USD per year or not.
Race Income ≤ 50K Income > 50K Total
American-Indian/Eskimo 382 53 435
Asian/Pacific-Islander 934 369 1,303
White 28,696 10,207 38, 903
Black 3,694 534 4, 228
Other 308 45 353
Total 34,014(75%) 11,208(25%) 45,222
Table A.2: [Adult dataset] Class distribution for different races. The classes are: whether
a person earns more than 50K USD per year or not.
—The Bank Marketing dataset (Bank, 2014): We consider age as the sensitive feature.
Age Term deposit: No Term deposit: Yes Total
25 ≤ age ≤ 60 35,240(90%) 3,970(10%) 39,210
age < 25 or age > 60 1,308(66%) 670(34%) 1,978
Total 36,548(89%) 4,640(11%) 41,188
Table A.3: [Bank dataset] Class distribution for different races. The classes are: whether
a person would subscribe for a term deposit or not.
—ProPublica COMAPS dataset (Larson et al., 2016a): We consider race as the sensitive
feature.
Appendix A. Dataset statistics 98
Race Recidivate Did not recidivate Total
Black 1, 661(52%) 1, 514(48%) 3, 175
White 8, 22(39%) 1, 281(61%) 2, 103
Total 2, 483(47%) 2, 795(53%) 5, 278
Table A.4: [ProPublica COMPAS dataset] Class distribution for different races. The
classes are: whether a defendant would receidivate within two years or not.
—NYPD SQF dataset (Stop, Question and Frisk Data, 2017): We consider race as the
sensitive feature.
Since the NYPD SQF policy changed over time, with significantly different number
of stops per year (NYCLU, 2018), we only use the data from the year 2012 for the sake
of consistency. As explained in Section 4.4.2, since the original dataset (Table A.5) is
highly skewed towards the positive class (person not found in posession of a weapon),
we subsample the majority class (positive) to match the size of the minority (negative)
class.
Race Weapon discovered: Yes Weapon discovered: No Total
Black 2, 113(3%) 77, 337(97%) 79, 450
White 803(15%) 4, 616(85%) 5, 419
Total 2, 916(3%) 81, 953(97%) 84, 869
Table A.5: [NYPD SQF dataset—original] Class distribution for different races. The
classes are: whether or not an illegal weapon would be recovered on a pedes-
trian stopped at the suspicion of carrying one.
Race Weapon discovered: Yes Weapon discovered: No Total
Black 2, 113(43%) 2, 756(57%) 4, 869
White 803(83%) 160(17%) 963
Total 2, 916(50%) 2, 916(50%) 5, 832
Table A.6: [NYPD SQF dataset—with balanced classes] Class distribution for different
races. The classes are: whether or not an illegal weapon would be recovered
on a pedestrian stopped at the suspicion of carrying one.
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